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TAXING  LOCAL  ENERGY  EXTERNALITIES
Hannah J. Wiseman*
There is a fundamental problem of scale in the governance of industrial development.  For
some of the fastest-growing U.S. industries, the negative impacts of development fall primarily at
the local level, and the benefits tend to accrue more broadly to states and the federal government.
These governments accordingly have inadequate incentives to address the very localized negative
externalities of development.  Yet states also increasingly preempt most local control over some
forms of development.  This creates a regulatory void, in which state and federal regulations are
inadequate, and local governments lack the power to use traditional Pigouvian tools such as
regulation, taxation, and liability to address local harms.  Without these Pigouvian sticks, local
governments are also constrained in their use of Coasean bargaining, in which they could
threaten regulation or taxation to bring industry to the table and negotiate for private solutions.
This gap is particularly evident in the energy space, in which oil and gas and associated pipe-
lines, wind energy, and solar energy have strong local effects, but local control is constrained to
varying degrees.
This Article explores the reasons for this governance gap, including federalism concerns,
political-economic factors, and views about the relative competency of local government, and it
proposes solutions that take these drivers into account.  The Article uses the areas of renewable
energy, oil and gas production, pipelines, and natural gas export terminals to demonstrate the
highly localized externalities of energy development, explore the Pigouvian and Coasean tools
available to address these externalities, and analyze state preemption of local governments’ use of
these tools.  Based on the lessons from these industries, it argues that a combined system of taxa-
tion and negotiation incentives would best fill the regulatory void in local energy law while
addressing the concerns that have created this void.
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INTRODUCTION
Some of the fastest-growing U.S. industries generate primarily localized
externalities, yet local governments have varied, often inadequate authority
to address intensely local harms.1  In the worst circumstance, these govern-
ments lack any of the classic Pigouvian “polluter pays” tools—regulation,
1 This Article defines externalities as “uncontracted” effects—effects that are not pur-
poseful on the part of the entity causing them but nonetheless occur.  For discussion of the
many meanings of the term externality and the confusion that has ensued, see A.H. Bar-
nett & Bruce Yandle, The End of the Externality Revolution, SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, July 2009, at
130, 130–138 (2009).
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taxes, or common-law liability—to force industry to internalize its harms.2
The absence of these traditional tools, and the presence of high transaction
costs, also weakens Coasean market-based solutions, in which communities
would bargain with developers to place a price on damages.3  Without an
entitlement to regulate the industry, tax it, or threaten meaningful liability,
the local government has a weak bargaining chip, if any.4
The energy sector offers a key example of this conundrum.  Energy is
necessary for human survival and economic growth.5  Although the need for
energy is constant, new forms of energy development are transforming the
U.S. economy and landscape.  In the past decade, companies have drilled
several hundred thousand new oil and gas wells in the United States due to
the rise of hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) technologies.6  Developers have
similarly capitalized on technological and price-based advances to build
thousands of new wind and solar installations.7  These industries continue to
2 A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 115, 168 (1920) (noting that costs of an
industry “might . . . [be] thrown upon other people not directly concerned, through, say,
uncompensated damage done to surrounding woods by sparks from railway engines” and
identifying taxes as a way for the state to address the problem of when “[t]he trade net
product of any unit of investment is unduly large relatively to the social net product”). See
also R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–2 (1960) (characterizing the
Pigouvian approach, which assumes that the polluter should bear the costs of internalizing
externalities, as including regulation, liability, and taxation).
3 See Coase, supra note 2, at 1–2 (asserting that as an alternative to the Pigouvian
approach, one should compare the cost of blocking an activity against the costs that the
activity imposes on neighbors, and the highest-valued (lowest cost) side should prevail in
negotiations, with the winning side paying the loser for the costs imposed on the loser).  In
the case of oil and gas development, individuals would have to pay industry to not operate,
or to internalize more of its externalities, because in most states industry has the initial
entitlement to engage in the activity.  This is more the case with oil and gas than with wind
energy, as discussed in Part II. See also Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1105
(1972) (explaining that under a property rule, “[n]o one can take the entitlement to pri-
vate property from the holder unless the holder sells it willingly and at the price at which
he subjectively values the property”).
4 See generally David B. Spence, The Political Economy of Local Vetoes, 93 TEX. L. REV. 351
(2014) (arguing that giving local governments the power to veto (ban) oil and gas develop-
ment would shift initial entitlements to development in a way that would encourage
negotiation).
5 See, e.g., U.S. Economy and Electricity Demand Growth Are Linked, But Relationship is
Changing, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 22, 2013), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.php?id=10491 (noting that economic growth and electricity use growth were previ-
ously “nearly equal in value,” although in the United States, electricity use no longer
expands at the same pace as economic growth due to energy efficiency).
6 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., THE DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. OIL AND NATURAL GAS WELLS
BY PRODUCTION RATE 1 (2019), https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/wells/pdf/full_report.pdf
(noting that “the number of producing wells in the United States increased from 729,000
in 2000 to a high of 1,035,000 wells in 2014, then declined to 982,000 wells in 2018” due to
lower oil prices).
7 State and local policies to address greenhouse gases from the energy sector have
also driven renewable energy development.
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grow at a breathtaking pace, with a projected 41,000 miles of new oil and gas
pipelines to be built in fewer than twenty years,8 and solar energy generation
projected to double in the next five years.9
The rapid transformation of the U.S. energy sector has generated
employment and wealth benefits, many of which accrue at the state and fed-
eral levels,10 but the costs of this development, such as noise, road damage,
traffic congestion, and light pollution during project construction, tend to
fall locally.11  In many cases, local governments would prefer to allow energy
development for reasons of revenue and job growth, but they also want to
control the negative externalities that accompany these benefits.12  Federal
and state governments typically lack adequate incentives to regulate, in part
8 KEVIN PETAK, JULIO MANIK & ANDREW GRIFFITH, ICF, NORTH AMERICAN MIDSTREAM
INFRASTRUCTURE THROUGH 2035: SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT CONTINUES 2 (2018), https://
www.ingaa.org/File.aspx?id=34658.
9 Solar Market Insight Report 2019 Q3, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N (Sept. 17, 2019),
https://www.seia.org/research-resources/solar-market-insight-report-2019-q3.
10 See, e.g., PAUL W. PARFOMAK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45239, INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS
PIPELINE SITING: FERC POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2 (2018) (noting that 26,000 miles of
new natural gas pipelines could be built between 2018 and 2035, with capital expenditures
amounting to “$154 billion to $190 billion”); James W. Coleman & Alexandra B. Klass,
Energy and Eminent Domain, 104 MINN. L. REV. 659, 676–80 (2019) (observing that recent
oil and gas development “did not fit the usual geography of oil and gas transport” as
regions like the U.S. Northeast that historically received oil from other regions “had gas to
export”); John M. Golden & Hannah J. Wiseman, The Fracking Revolution: Shale Gas as a
Case Study in Innovation Policy, 64 EMORY L.J. 955, 966–67 (2015) (noting exponential
growth in shale gas production); Thomas W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and
Gas Revolution, Hydraulic Fracturing, and Water Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy, 98 MINN.
L. REV. 145, 157 (2013) (observing that shale gas and oil development are “expected to
generate $172.5 billion of investment annually by the end of the decade and $5.1 trillion in
total by 2035”); Wind Energy Continues Rapid Growth, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Oct. 18, 2017),
https://www.energy.gov/eere/wind/articles/wind-energy-continues-rapid-growth
(“America’s wind industry added more than 8,200 megawatts (MW) of capacity and sup-
ported more than 101,000 jobs in 2016 . . . .”).
11 David Spence has extensively documented the disproportionate allocation of exter-
nalities in the oil and gas context, noting how most of the negative harms fall at the local
level, whereas the benefits accrue more to the states.  Spence, supra note 4, at 380–84
(concluding that “the most certain and tangible costs of fracking fall most heavily on
locals”).  For discussion of the widespread benefits of unconventional natural gas develop-
ment, see, for example, Merrill & Schizer, supra note 10, at 157–70 (discussing the eco-
nomic-, environmental-, and security-based benefits of expanding domestic gas
development); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Natural Gas Fracking Addresses All of Our Major Problems,
4 J. ENERGY & ENV’T L. 22, 23–24 (2013) (arguing that the growth of natural gas produc-
tion has extensive economic and environmental benefits).  For a discussion of local govern-
ment officials who report net positive community benefits from shale gas development, see
Richard G. Newell & Daniel Raimi, Shale Public Finance: Local Government Revenues and Costs
Associated with Oil and Gas Development 7–11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper
No. 21542, 2015).
12 See, e.g., DANIEL RAIMI, THE FRACKING DEBATE: THE RISKS, BENEFITS, AND UNCERTAIN-
TIES OF THE SHALE REVOLUTION 193–98 (2018) (describing local government officials who
supported shale gas development in their communities); Newell & Raimi, supra note 11, at
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because they primarily experience benefits.13  This leaves to local govern-
ments the challenging task of adequately controlling energy-based externali-
ties.  In some contexts, such as the construction of liquefied natural gas
(LNG) export terminals and wind and solar farms, local governments have
the ability to address harms through regulation or negotiation for commu-
nity benefits.14  In contrast, many local governments are preempted from
regulating, and have few bargaining chips, in the oil and gas production and
interstate natural gas (“gas”) pipeline contexts.  Many of the states with sub-
stantial levels of oil and gas production bar local governments from control-
ling the externalities of development,15 and the federal government bars
nearly all local control over natural gas pipelines.16  For the most problem-
atic cases, there is little federal regulation of the industry, state regulation is
also sparse, and states have preempted most forms of local government con-
trol over the industry.17  Under this aggressive preemption regime, local gov-
23–24 (noting net positive revenues in Fort Worth, Texas, from shale gas development, but
also noting costs incurred by the city).
13 For arguments that federal and state regulation of oil and gas development is inade-
quate, see generally Michael Burger, Fracking and Federalism Choice, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
ONLINE 150 (2013); Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in Fracturing Policy, 84 U. COLO.
L. REV. 729 (2013).  For arguments that federal pipeline safety regulation is inadequate,
see, for example, Sara Gosman, Planning for Failure: Pipelines, Risk, and the Energy Revolution,
81 OHIO ST. L.J. 349, 352–53 (2020).  For discussion of the scale of benefits, see, for exam-
ple, ALAN J. KRUPNICK & ISABEL ECHARTE, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
UNCONVENTIONAL OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT 16–17 (2017), https://media.rff.org/
archive/files/document/file/RFF-Rpt-ShaleReviews_Economic%20Impacts_0.pdf (survey-
ing studies of the economic impacts of shale gas development and noting local benefits but
also the many benefits that instead accrue regionally); OECD, LINKING RENEWABLE ENERGY
TO RURAL DEVELOPMENT 73 (2012) (noting that renewable energy developers “typically
source labour and equipment from international suppliers, so the impact at the commu-
nity level in terms of job creation is rather limited”).
14 Many states do not preempt local control of wind energy development. See Uma
Outka, Intrastate Preemption in the Shifting Energy Sector, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 927, 981 (2015)
(noting that, in 2014, approximately forty-eight states allowed local governments “signifi-
cant control” over decisions about the location (siting) of commercial wind farms).  The
federal government also explicitly grants local governments safety-based input through
state agencies in the liquefied natural gas terminal siting process.  15 U.S.C. § 717b-1
(2018).
15 In other cases, communities do not wish to limit the externalities at all, calculating
that the raw economic benefits from the activity are so great that regulating or taxing the
activity to shift the burden of the externalities away from industry is not merited. See infra
Part I (discussing the example of coal communities in West Virginia and some oil and gas
communities).
16 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (2018).
17 Many states—including those that host some of the most oil and gas production in
the United States—preempt or substantially curtail local control of oil and gas develop-
ment. See Hannah J. Wiseman, Disaggregating Preemption in Energy Law, 40 HARV. ENV’T L.
REV. 293, 296 & n.8 (2016) (noting preemption of most local control over oil and gas
development in seven states, including, among others, Texas and Oklahoma).
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ernments cannot use ex ante strategies such as regulation to address local
externalities. 18
Local governments do not just experience pure regulatory preemption in
the oil and gas production and pipeline contexts.  They are hamstrung under
both a Pigouvian and a Coasean approach to externalities.  A Pigouvian solu-
tion would force industry, rather than society, to pay for its externalities by
avoiding them altogether, paying a tax or fee to cover the damages, or paying
damages under a legal liability regime.19  But many communities lack ade-
quate regulatory or fiscal authority over energy industries with very localized
effects.20  Further, state tort policy does not generally favor either private
individuals or local governments in these cases.21  Under an alternative
Coasean framework, private individuals or local governments would pay
industry—which has a property entitlement allowing it to operate—to pro-
duce fewer externalities.22  But local governments often only have limited
18 15 U.S.C. § 717f (2018) (preempting state and local control over pipelines).  For
use of the term “aggressive preemption” and discussion of its recent expansion, including
in the area of fracking, see Richard Briffault, Essay, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70
STAN. L. REV. 1995, 1998, 2011 (2018); Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities,
96 TEX. L. REV. 1163, 1173–74 (2018) (discussing preemption specific to hydraulic
fracturing).
19 See PIGOU, supra note 2, at 149, 168 (noting the possibility of addressing the “diver-
gence” between profits and net social impacts through restraints or encouragements);
Janet E. Milne, Environmental Taxation in the United States: The Long View, 15 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 417, 418 (2011) (noting that “[a]lthough not confined to environmental problems,
[Pigou’s] concept has become synonymous with the principle of internalizing environmen-
tal externalities”); OECD, THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE: DEFINITION ANALYSIS IMPLEMENTA-
TION 6 (1975).
20 See, e.g., RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL AGE
69–77 (2016) (noting substantial limits on local governments’ fiscal authority); Erin Adele
Scharff, Powerful Cities?: Limits on Municipal Taxing Authority and What to Do About Them, 91
N.Y.U. L. REV. 292, 296 (2016) (“Traditionally, states have granted local governments very
limited revenue-generating authority, even as compared to other home rule powers.” (foot-
note omitted)) [hereinafter Scharff, Powerful Cities?]; Erin Scharff, Preemption and Fiscal
Authority, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1270, 1273–75 (2018) [hereinafter Scharff, Preemption and
Fiscal Authority]. See also Spence, supra note 4, at 395 (“[S]ome will see the introduction of
noise, truck traffic, air emissions, and other by-products of fracking in Pigovian terms, as
attempts to shift costs of production to society, costs that ought to be internalized.” (foot-
note omitted)).
21 With respect to private nuisance, see, e.g., BLAKE WATSON, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
TORT LITIGATION SUMMARY 6–9 (2020), https://udayton.edu/directory/law/documents/
watson/blake_watson_hydraulic_fracturing_primer.pdf (showing numerous hydraulic frac-
turing cases dismissed by courts, although many also settled); Ryan Kusmin, Note, Sucking
the Air Out of Wind Energy: Nuisance Litigation and Its Effect on Wind Energy Development, 88
WASH. U. L. REV. 707, 715–22 (2011) (noting how, of the four wind-related nuisance cases
identified as of 2011, in three of the cases the court found no nuisance or no justiciable
claim). But see Rose v. Chaikin, 453 A.2d 1378, 1382, 1384 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982)
(enjoining a wind turbine in a private nuisance case).  For differing views on the nature of
public nuisance and who may file a claim, see infra note 175 and accompanying text.
22 The property entitlement means that industry has the right to operate and that
individuals or communities must pay industry a subjectively determined amount to reduce
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power, if any, to control the harm-producing activity.23  In many states, the
oil and gas industry holds the bulk of the initial entitlement—the ability to
operate free of many local legal interventions—and thus might not even
come to the bargaining table, let alone accept a payment for limiting exter-
nalities.24  And even if there were more incentives to bargain, the transaction
costs of entering into extensive negotiations with hundreds of different local
governments would further impede negotiation.
In short, some communities that host energy industries with very local-
ized effects—particularly oil and gas and pipelines—operate within a regula-
tory void caused by state preemption.  Without the option of regulation,25
fiscal tools, liability, or adequate negotiation, empirical data suggests that
many governments experiencing these externalities would simply choose the
extreme solution of banning the industry26 or resorting to scaremongering—
exaggerating the real risks of energy development and even inventing
unproven ones.27  This has the effect of wholly blocking development rather
than achieving a middle ground.28
the externalities of operation. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 3, at 1105.  David
Spence has extensively analyzed the Coasean option in the oil and gas production context.
Spence, supra note 4, at 394–97.
23 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.  Under the Calabresi-Melamed approach
to Coase, this means that local governments essentially operate under an inalienability
rule.  When they are fully preempted by state governments, they are forced to allow the
activity and are not compensated for having to shoulder this burden. See Calabresi &
Melamed, supra note 3, at 1092–93 (describing inalienability).
24 Cf. Spence, supra note 4, at 397 (“[A] rule against preemption will stimulate bar-
gaining in ways that a rule permitting preemption probably would not.”).  In states like
Texas, Ohio, and Oklahoma, local governments are preempted from regulating most
aspects of oil and gas development. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 137.1 (2020) (preempting
most local regulation of oil and gas development); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 81.0523
(West 2019); State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 37 N.E.3d 128, 135, 136–37 (Ohio
2015) (finding that Ohio law preempts nearly all local control over oil and gas develop-
ment, including, for example, requiring a permit or requiring industry to post a bond for
damages that it might cause).
25 I define regulations as including local ordinances that control actual industry opera-
tions or include land use controls, such as zoning, that constrain the location of industrial
development.
26 See Robert D. Cheren, Fracking Bans, Taxation, and Environmental Policy, 64 CASE W.
RSRV. L. REV. 1483, 1484–97 (2014) (concluding that local governments that draw “addi-
tional revenue” from fracking (such as taxes)—additional to the raw economic benefits,
thus providing some compensation for externalities—are less likely to ban fracking,
whereas those with limited taxation options and thus little additional revenue are more
likely to ban it). See also Spence, supra note 4, at 394–95 (noting the mirror image of
Cheren’s observation, which is that local governments that are allowed to tax oil and gas
development are less likely to ban it).
27 Cf. David B. Spence, Regulation and the New Politics of (Energy) Market Entry, 95 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 327, 364–67 (2019) (empirically documenting local NGOs’ use of these tac-
tics to oppose oil and gas and wind energy projects).
28 Of course, some governments with adequate tools to address externalities also
choose the extreme, problematic options from the perspective of blocking needed devel-
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There are several factors that cause this void.  First, local governments
start from a position of relative powerlessness with respect to regulatory and
taxation powers.  The dominant legal presumption is that local governments
are merely an arm of the state and possess only the powers delegated to them
from states.29  Second, higher-level governments are wary of delegating too
much authority to local governments—sometimes due to concerns about
local competency,30 but also for purely political-economic reasons.  Powerful
national industries like oil and gas operators, pipeline developers, and wind
energy companies have concentrated influence that may allow them to effec-
tively lobby for weaker local authority.  Their power is most pronounced at
the centralized national or state levels, where lobbying resources are most
efficiently deployed and can be focused on efforts to preempt local control.31
Federalism concerns, too, cause states to resist allocating power to local gov-
ernments.  Governments worry that a patchwork of conflicting regulations
will impede development, lead to a race to the bottom, or simply interfere
with centralized goals.32
The regulatory void produced by these factors in the oil and gas and
pipeline context offers a stark contrast to the relative powers of local govern-
ments in the renewable energy and liquefied natural gas terminal contexts.33
This Article proposes tools that local governments should have at their dispo-
sal in all energy contexts.  Specifically, it argues that Pigouvian taxation and
other financial instruments—combined with a framework to encourage lim-
ited Coasean negotiation—should be available to local governments.
opment. Documents Filed Under Zoning/Planning from USA, WINDACTION, http://www.wind
action.org/posts?utf8=%E2%9C%93&type=document&topic=zoning%2FPlanning&loca-
tion=USA (last visited Sept. 13, 2020) (noting a San Bernadino County, California, ban on
large-scale renewable energy projects; a Linn County, Kansas, moratorium on wind energy
development; a Somerset County, Maine, resolution that opposes any additional wind
energy development in the county; a Perquimans County, North Carolina, denial of a wind
farm permit; a Buckfield, Maine, ordinance that placed a very high setback requirement
on wind farms—one mile between a wind turbine and the adjacent property line; and an
Elmwood Township, Michigan, moratorium on wind farms).
29 See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1105–09, 1113
(1980) (noting rejection of early judicial arguments that municipalities had organic
authority).
30 See, e.g., Schragger, supra note 18, at 1196 (“Municipal politics is viewed as more
corrupt than state or national politics, more prone to capture by special interests, more
wasteful, and more incompetent.”).
31 See, e.g., David Iaconangelo, Lobbying Sets Record as Big Coal, Beach Towns Push Back,
E&E NEWS (May 1, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060248953/print (noting
large sums of money spent by offshore wind developers on state-level lobbying); Mike
Soraghan, Industry Pours Campaign Cash into State, Local Races, E&E NEWS (Dec. 9, 2011),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1059957451 (noting in 2010, “the oil and gas industry
gave state candidates a record $34 million”).
32 See, e.g., Cap. Area Dist. Libr. v. Mich. Open Carry, Inc., 826 N.W.2d 736, 745 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2012) (concluding that allowing each local government to regulate firearms pos-
session “would undoubtedly lead to patchwork regulation”).
33 See supra note 14.
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Through this solution, states would create a uniform tax or fee that local
governments could choose to levy on industries that generate disproportion-
ately localized externalities.  And because designing a tax that fully addressed
local externalities while not overcontrolling them would involve too many
transaction costs, the federal government or states should mandate or incen-
tivize developer negotiation with local governments.34
From a political economy perspective, giving local governments limited
powers to tax industry to compensate for its local externalities—essentially a
Pigouvian “polluter pays” tax—may be more politically palatable than grant-
ing them broad regulatory authority or modifying tort liability.  It will also
address the federalism concerns associated with a conflicting patchwork of
local regulations, and, because the tax would be administered by the state, it
would alleviate worries about the comparative competence of local
governments.
Part I of the Article documents the highly localized externalities of some
of the fastest-growing U.S. energy industries as compared to the broader ben-
efits that these industries produce.  Part II then explores the Pigouvian and
Coasean tools available to address these localized externalities, including
traditional regulation, tort law, revenue-generating financial tools, and gov-
ernment negotiation with industry for community benefits or mitigation of
impacts.  This Part also documents the regulatory void, in which local govern-
ments lack access to many of these tools, particularly in the oil and gas pro-
duction and pipeline contexts.  Part III then analyzes the factors that cause
this problematic void, some more legitimate than others.  These include con-
cerns relating to government competence, federalism issues, and political-
economic factors.  Finally, Part IV proposes a fiscal and negotiation-based
solution to the regulatory void, which would address concerns about strong
local authority while ensuring that localized externalities are adequately
addressed.
Relying on local fiscal tools and negotiation to address powerful local
externalities will not satisfy all constituencies and will not adequately address
certain harms.  Harms with irrevocable and difficult-to-remedy effects, such
as deaths from pipeline explosions, require regulatory prevention in addition
to ex post remedies.  But taxation and similar financial tools combined with
negotiation, where appropriate, might lead to more cautious industrial deci-
sions at the front end, potentially encouraging behavior that prevents local-
ized externalities in light of their costs.
34 For a discussion of the problems with state approaches to externalities, and criticism
of economists’ tendency to inaccurately view the state as an “omniscient” and “well-moti-
vated” force that will make “corrective adjustments for externalities,” see Harold Demsetz,
The Core Disagreement Between Pigou, the Profession, and Coase in the Analyses of the Externality
Question, 12 EURPOEAN J. POL. ECON. 565, 566–67 (1996).
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I. WIDESPREAD BENEFITS, LOCALIZED BURDENS, AND UNEVEN
LOCAL CONTROL
Local governments and their constituents experience a wide range of
negative and positive externalities from industry—impacts from an activity
that are not fully addressed by the entity that causes them.35  Externalities
from any activity with a physical presence, ranging from sports stadiums to
manufacturing facilities and energy development, often fall most heavily at
the local level.36  This is because the local government experiences some of
the impacts that also extend more broadly, such as air pollution in the oil
and gas context or wildlife habitat destruction from most types of energy
development.37  In addition to these shared costs, the community suffers dis-
tinct localized harms, such as increased vehicle traffic, aesthetic changes, and
noise, that are uniquely location-based.  Thousands of acres of land are
needed to produce fuel or electricity, thus literally requiring that develop-
ment occur in the backyards of schools and homes, farm or ranch fields, and
the like.38
The uneven distribution of costs and benefits presents several distinct
challenges.  Giving local governments too much control can lead to over-
exclusion of the industrial activity because governments suffering substantial
costs will potentially ban or substantially curb the activity.39  The literature on
the “Not in My Back Yard” syndrome, or NIMBYism, has documented this
likelihood.40  But leaving too much authority at the state and federal levels
35 See, e.g., PIGOU, supra note 2, at 115 (although not using the term “externality,”
describing the condition later defined as an externality, which is when industry causes
effects that are “thrown upon other people not directly concerned” with the industry, for
which those people are not compensated); Barnett & Yandle, supra note 1, at 138–39
(describing the origins of the concept of the externality as largely resting with Pigou).
36 Entities that engage in more abstract commerce, such as software companies, have
less of a physical presence and less local impact, but even these industries have more local-
ized impacts than typically conceded—they have physical servers and battery banks, for
example. Cf. Andrew Keane Woods, Against Data Exceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REV. 729, 734
(2016) (rebutting arguments that internet data is “different” and that traditional notions
of jurisdictional control should not apply to this data).
37 See, e.g., Jeffrey E. Lovich & Joshua R. Ennen, Wildlife Conservation and Solar Energy
Development in the Desert Southwest, United States, 61 BIOSCIENCE 982, 984–85 (2011) (describ-
ing the impacts of solar project construction and decommissioning on wildlife, including
endangered species).
38 See, e.g., David A. Dana & Hannah J. Wiseman, Fracking as a Test of the Demsetz Property
Rights Thesis, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 845, 871–72 (2020) (describing oil and gas development in
backyards and near schools); Anne M. Trainor, Robert I. McDonald & Joseph Fargione,
Energy Sprawl Is the Largest Driver of Land Use Change in United States, PLOS ONE, Sept. 2016,
at 1, 7 (describing the massive amounts of land required for energy development).
39 See, e.g., Patricia E. Salkin & Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Cooperative Federalism and Wind:
A New Framework for Achieving Sustainability, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1049, 1091–97 (2009)
(arguing for limits on local control over wind energy); Spence, supra note 4, at 389–90
(noting the potential for overregulation of fracking by local governments).
40 See, e.g., K.K. DuVivier & Thomas Witt, NIMBY to NOPE—or YESS?, 38 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1453, 1466–70 (2017) (noting communities that have blocked important renewable
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and stripping local governments of most meaningful control tips the scales
too heavily in favor of development.  In the context of zero-carbon energy
sources like renewables, there is a growing sense of urgency to develop
cleaner energy infrastructure as quickly as possible.41  But a rapid transition
does not have to mean that governments must ignore all local externalities
when approving needed infrastructure.  At a minimum, development could
quickly proceed while ensuring that communities receive the funds they
need to address some of the most negative effects of that development.
Some communities are also at the opposite end of the spectrum from
NIMBYism—they welcome industrial development and oppose any regula-
tion of it, for fear of decreasing revenues.  This is the case with some coal
mining communities, which are highly dependent on coal mining for jobs
and local revenue, and which view federal regulation of air pollution from
coal as an unjust “war on coal.”42  I leave discussion of these types of commu-
nities for another day, focusing instead on the many communities that want
to find a middle ground but cannot due to the regulatory void.
A. Oil and Gas Development
Oil and gas development is a powerful example of an industrial activity
with disproportionately local effects, and an industry that many communities
want to allow, but within limits.43  In the United States, this development
typically requires drilling and hydraulically fracturing (“fracking”) as well.
Thousands of wells must be drilled to access underground oil and gas reser-
voirs, and the rise of fracking in the United States has caused a surge in oil
and gas development, thus producing more waste that is disposed of in
energy projects); Barak D. Richman & Christopher Boerner, A Transaction Cost Economizing
Approach to Regulation: Understanding the NIMBY Problem and Improving Regulatory Responses,
23 YALE J. ON REGUL. 29, 32 (2006) (observing that “[t]he NIMBY syndrome . . . has stymied
policy makers, local land use planners, and developers for generations” and noting that
NIMBYism has become so problematic that some facilities are simply not sited anywhere).
41 See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF
1.5°C, at 40 (Valérie Masson-Delmotte et al. eds., 2019) [hereinafter IPCC] (noting that
“[l]imiting warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels would require transformative sys-
temic change” including renewables); Jeffrey Thaler, Fiddling as the World Floods and Burns:
How Climate Change Urgently Requires a Paradigm Shift in the Permitting of Renewable Energy
Projects, 42 ENV’T L. 1101, 1103–04 (2012) (noting the environmental laws that impede
renewable energy projects).
42 See, e.g., Patrick C. McGinley, From Pick and Shovel to Mountaintop Removal: Environ-
mental Injustice in the Appalachian Coalfields, 34 ENV’T L. 21, 50 (2004) (“From the beginning
of . . . efforts to regulate strip mining, the coal industry cooperated with local and state
politicians to oppose meaningful state regulation.”).
43 See, e.g., Cheren, supra note 26, at 1499 (arguing that in communities with the
power to tax natural gas, fracking bans are “exceedingly scarce”); supra note 12 (describing
local support for shale gas and oil development coupled with local efforts to address exter-
nalities, such as monitoring for environmental effects).
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thousands of communities around the country.44  Oil and gas well sites are
individually relatively small—somewhere between five to ten acres—but they
are numerous.45  For example, the city of Fort Worth, Texas, has more than
two thousand natural gas wells within city limits.46  On or near any given well
site, spills of chemicals can occur,47 air pollution from diesel rig motors and
other equipment can be substantial, dust and noise are common, and—
absent regulation—bright lights from twenty-four-hour operations disrupt
residents.48
Although the full risks of oil and gas drilling and fracking have yet to be
documented, the studies so far show powerful localized effects from this
small, highly dispersed form of development.  For example, one study con-
cluded that babies born to parents who live close to well sites with fracking
activity have lower birth weights.49  Fracking, which requires millions of gal-
lons of water for each well, also has primarily localized water scarcity effects—
drying up small streams or portions of them and causing fish kills, for exam-
ple.50  Chemicals used in fracking, as well as fracking and drilling wastes,
regularly spill at or near oil and gas sites and sometimes migrate offsite, dam-
aging nearby land or water.51  Livestock and pets near the sites are negatively
impacted, with some studies showing higher rates of animal illness and
deaths near well sites.52  Further, disposal wells for liquid waste from drilling
and fracking have had the largest impacts at the local level.  Trucks carrying
44 See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 6, at 1, 8, B18 (showing 433,434 oil
wells and 556,837 natural gas wells (conventional and hydraulically fractured, for both
types of wells) in the United States in 2017).
45 Michael Focazio, Geographic Footprint, in INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L. ACADS.,
HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF SHALE GAS EXTRACTION: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 23–24 (2014).
46 Gas Well Drilling, CITY OF FORT WORTH, https://www.fortworthtexas.gov/depart-
ments/development-services/gaswells (last visited Oct. 29, 2020) (click on “View a map”;
then click on “Gas Well Locations” under “Info Summary”).
47 See Lauren A. Patterson et al., Unconventional Oil and Gas Spills: Risks, Mitigation Pri-
orities, and State Reporting Requirements, 51 ENV’T SCI. & TECH. 2563, 2565, 2567 (2017)
(describing spill rates).
48 See, e.g., Letter from Ivan Dubrasky to the EPA Science Advisory Board Hydraulic
Fracking Research Advisory Panel (Jan. 25, 2016) (available at https://yosemite.epa.gov/
sab/sabproduct.nsf/479CF36A838E21C285257F490062F313/$File/
Oral+Statement§ubmitted£y+Ivan‡ubrasky.pdf) (providing a resident’s statement regard-
ing bright lights and dust).
49 Janet Currie, Michael Greenstone & Katherine Meckel, Hydraulic Fracturing and
Infant Health: New Evidence from Pennsylvania, SCI. ADVANCES, Dec. 13, 2017, at 1.
50 See, e.g., Sally Entrekin et al., Water Stress from High-Volume Hydraulic Fracturing Poten-
tially Threatens Aquatic Biodiversity and Ecosystems in Arkansas, United States, 52 ENV’T SCI. &
TECH. 2349, 2353–55 (2018) (noting how water withdrawals for fracturing even one well
could cause water levels to drop to dangerously low levels in small streams).
51 See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 13, at 800–01 (describing incidents in which pollu-
tants from drilling or fracturing migrated offsite).
52 Michelle Bamberger & Robert E. Oswald, Impacts of Gas Drilling on Human and
Animal Health, 22 NEW SOLS. 51, 59–61 (2012).
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waste to and from the wells create traffic congestion, noise, and dust.53  The
wells sometimes cause earthquakes, which, if large enough in magnitude, typ-
ically damage structures closest to the epicenter of the earthquakes.54
Local social impacts are also well documented.  Booms in oil and gas
development involve hundreds or thousands of workers rushing into a com-
munity, causing the price of basic goods to increase for local residents and
sometimes leading to housing shortages.  Oil and gas employees outcompete
local residents for apartment rentals.55  The spike in development also
increases demand for government-provided services such as courts, emer-
gency response, and schools.56  Some governments have incurred millions of
dollars in debt to provide such infrastructure and services.57
Communities hosting oil and gas development experience important
benefits, too, such as employment, increased income for landowners who
lease their mineral rights, and tax revenues from higher property tax assess-
ments and hotel and tourism taxes.58  But many of the benefits accrue more
broadly, with employment coming largely from outside of the community59
and wealth flowing primarily to a company typically headquartered far from
53 See, e.g., R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future and Clean Water,
336 S.W.3d 619, 622 (Tex. 2011) (noting these traffic-related concerns); U.S. FOREST SERV.,
EMISSION REDUCTION TECHNIQUES FOR OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES 3 (2011), https://
www.fs.fed.us/air/documents/EmissionReduction-072011x.pdf (noting “windblown dust”
from truck activity).
54 Katie M. Keranen, Heather M. Savage, Geoffrey A. Abers & Elizabeth S. Cochran,
Potentially Induced Earthquakes in Oklahoma, USA: Links Between Wastewater Injection and the
2011 Mw 5.7 Earthquake Sequence, 41 GEOLOGY 699, 699–700 (2013) (noting an earthquake
induced by injection that “destroyed 14 homes, damaged many other buildings, injured 2
people, and buckled pavement” near the epicenter of the quake).
55 JONATHAN WILLIAMSON & BONITA KOLB, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF CMTY. & THE ECON.,
MARCELLUS NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT’S EFFECT ON HOUSING IN PENNSYLVANIA 1 (2011),
https://www.phfa.org/forms/housing_study/2011/marcellus_report.pdf (noting the use
of “man camps” for “the first transitory wave of gas workers”); Susan Christopherson & Ned
Rightor, How Shale Gas Extraction Affects Drilling Localities: Lessons for Regional and City Policy
Makers, J. TOWN & CITY MGMT., no. 4, 2012,  at 1, 15 (noting rising rental costs).
56 See, e.g., Newell & Raimi, supra note 11, at 28 (noting that Midland, Texas, had to
add more staff to police and fire departments as a result of the shale gas boom and spent
approximately $4 million on a fire station and $9 million on a courthouse).
57 See, e.g., id. at 43 (noting that Watford City, North Dakota, had no outstanding debt
prior to the shale oil boom but incurred $12.5 million in debt to finance the “necessary
expansion of city services” caused by the boom); id. at 45 (noting that Dickinson, North
Dakota, also had no debt prior to the boom but then issued $100 million in bonds).
58 See, e.g., Dusan Paredes, Timothy Komarek & Scott Loveridge, Income and Employ-
ment Effects of Shale Gas Extraction Windfalls: Evidence from the Marcellus Region, 47 ENERGY
ECON. 112, 114, 120 (2015).
59 See Charles F. Mason, Lucija A. Muehlenbachs & Sheila M. Olmstead, The Economics
of Shale Gas Development, 7 ANN. REV. RES. ECON. 269, 274–75 (2015) (noting the “resource
curse” but also positive local benefits); Paredes et al., supra note 58, at 120 (noting that
natural gas development relies largely on out-of-state workers with the exception of truck-
ing and construction).
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the communities experiencing energy development.60  As a result, in some
regions, the local benefits do not appear to outweigh the distinct local
harms.61
Many states, perhaps in light of the financial benefits of oil and gas
development, view their explicit role as cheerleaders for the oil and gas
industry.62  Old statutes have long directed state oil and gas commissions to
maximize production of the resources that they govern, and state agencies
continue to take this mission quite seriously.63  Additionally, the powerful
Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission (IOGCC)—an association of
the petroleum-producing U.S. states—is a formidable opponent to more
stringent environmental regulation of oil and gas.64  Governor members of
the IOGCC regularly interact with powerful repeat industry players, and the
organization explicitly caters to industry, advertising to industry sponsors on
the website for its 2019 annual meeting: “The meeting offers a unique oppor-
tunity to spotlight your business and interact with . . . governors; state, provin-
cial and federal legislators and regulators; and prominent oil and gas
industry representatives.”65
Whether for reasons of capture, a genuine belief in the safety of oil and
gas development, or a focus on the importance of the widespread economic
benefits of oil and gas development, state and federal officials have so far
largely refrained from imposing substantial regulatory curbs on local dam-
60 Christopherson & Rightor, supra note 55, at 5; David Kay, The Economic Impact of
Marcellus Shale Gas Drilling: What Have We Learned?  What Are the Limitations? 25–26
(Apr. 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
download;jsessionid=9B0EA7834DFEA839ECDA355B7AA7D2AA?doi=10.1.1.588.2856&
rep=rep1&type=pdf) (noting that models often fail to examine the extent to which “money
that flows into the community is either not respent locally or in fact accrues to nonlocal or
temporary residents and firms”); cf. Paredes et al., supra note 58, at 120 (concluding that
“direct income effects of Pennsylvania Marcellus shale fracking activities are likely to have
negligible indirect or induced income impacts on the general population in a county
where a well is drilled”).
61 See, e.g., Newell & Raimi, supra note 11, at 2 (showing that areas where benefits do
not outweigh harms include North Dakota and parts of Wyoming and Colorado).
62 See, e.g., National Energy Policy, INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMM’N, http://
iogcc.ok.gov/Default.aspx?shortcut=national-energy-policy (last visited Oct. 29, 2020)
(arguing, in a statement from the Commission, which is a collection of oil and gas produc-
ing states, that states “will continue to fight for the responsible development of our nations
[sic] resources” and citing to the “decline of domestic production” as a concern).
63 But see Tara K. Righetti, The Incidental Environmental Agency, 2020 UTAH L. REV. 685,
687, 725–26 (noting how recent lawsuits have forced state oil and gas conservation commis-
sions to take on more of an environmental regulatory role).
64 See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Amendments of 1991: Hearing on S. 976
Before the Subcomm. on Env’t Prot. of the S. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, 102d Cong. 99–100
(1991) (statement of W. Timothy Dowd, Executive Director, Interstate Oil and Gas Com-
pact Commission) (testifying in favor of exempting oil and gas wastes from hazardous
waste regulation under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act).
65 2020 Sponsorship Information, INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMM’N, http://
iogcc.ok.gov/sponsorship-information (last visited Sept. 7, 2020).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-2\NDL203.txt unknown Seq: 15  1-DEC-20 13:47
2020] taxing  local  energy  externalities 577
ages from oil and gas development.66  And as discussed in Part II, a growing
number of states have preempted local governments from addressing these
damages.
B. Pipelines
The recent boom in oil and gas production in the United States has
triggered a related surge of pipeline construction.  In just over a decade,
pipeline companies in the United States have constructed more than 125,000
miles of oil and gas pipelines, and they expect to construct 41,000 more miles
of pipeline by 2035.67  Compare this with the U.S. interstate highway system,
which includes fewer than 47,000 miles of roadway.68  This Section focuses
on interstate gas pipelines, in particular, because local governments experi-
ence the most preemption for these types of pipelines.69  Interstate oil pipe-
lines, in contrast, receive siting approval from each state in which they are
located, and many states give local governments at least some say in the deci-
sion to approve an oil pipeline.70
Natural gas pipelines are buried, but they require a thirty-to-fifty-foot-
wide permanently open corridor to allow for access for inspection and main-
tenance during the life of their operation.71  As with oil and gas well sites,
during construction, local impacts include potential short-term housing scar-
city; increased truck traffic; diesel construction equipment with localized air
66 For a discussion of limited regulations, see, for example, Wiseman, supra note 13, at
738–41.  There are important exceptions.  Colorado now allows extensive local control of
oil and gas development.  S.B. 19-181, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2019).  And as
discussed in Part IV of this Article, Pennsylvania allows local governments to impose a fee
on hydraulically fractured (unconventional) oil and gas wells. See also Thomas Kaplan,
Citing Health Risks, Cuomo Bans Fracking in New York State, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/nyregion/cuomo-to-ban-fracking-in-new-york-
state-citing-health-risks.html (describing New York’s ban on fracking).
67 See PETAK, ET AL., supra note 8, at 2; U.S. Oil and Gas Pipeline Mileage, BUREAU OF
TRANSP. STATS., https://www.bts.gov/content/us-oil-and-gas-pipeline-mileage (last visited
Sept. 17, 2020) (showing increase in number of miles of oil and gas pipeline by year).
68 Interstate Frequently Asked Questions, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., https://
www.fhwa.dot.gov/interstate/faq.cfm (last visited Sept. 7, 2020).
69 15 U.S.C. § 717f (2018) (placing all responsibility for approving interstate natural
gas pipelines in federal hands).  Indeed, interstate gas pipeline companies initially lobbied
for state preemption “to avoid local and municipal regulation.” See Alexandra B. Klass &
Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S. Infrastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA L.
REV. 947, 993 (2015).
70 See, e.g., Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 69, at 1027–53 (showing that although most
states situate siting authority within a centralized commission, some states still allow limited
local control).
71 See Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n v. Forest Serv., 911 F.3d 150, 155 (4th Cir. 2018)
(noting that the corridor is thirty feet wide in wetlands and fifty feet wide elsewhere), rev’d,
140 S. Ct. 1837 (2020).
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emissions; and noise, dust, and lights from this equipment.72  Construction
of pipelines also leads to soil erosion, which can pollute local streams and
other waterbodies.73  During the construction of the Mountain Valley Pipe-
line, the State of Virginia alleged that the pipeline company caused multiple
violations of the Clean Water Act, causing soil to wash off of steep slopes
during heavy rains.74
Once the pipeline has been constructed and buried, the open corridor
remains—thus impacting the local landscape and fragmenting wildlife
habitat.75  Further, safety issues, including methane leaks and explosions, are
somewhat rare, yet potentially deadly when they occur.  Over the past twenty
years (through 2019), there have been 1404 “significant” gas pipeline inci-
dents that killed 49 people, injured 175 people, and caused more than $2
billion in damage.76  All of these are distinctly local effects.  The people who
die and are injured are those who are near the pipeline at the time of the
explosion, and the property damaged is immediately in the vicinity of the
pipeline.  Other environmental effects of the pipeline, such as soil erosion,
also impact local streams and other resources in addition to having broader
effects.77
The federal government, alone, regulates the siting (location) and con-
struction of interstate gas pipelines and preempts local control over these
pipelines.78  The government primarily grants approval on grounds that the
pipeline is economically needed—taking environmental and safety consider-
ations into account, but only as one, often more minor factor in its economic
72 See, e.g., FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, MOUNTAIN VALLEY PROJECT AND EQUITRANS
EXPANSION PROJECT: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, at ES-10 to ES-14 (describ-
ing these impacts in association with the Mountain Valley Pipeline).
73 See, e.g., id. at ES-5.
74 Keith Goldberg, Mountain Valley Pipeline Pays $2M to End Va. Pollution Suit, LAW360,
(Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1208847/mountain-valley-pipeline-pays-
2m-to-end-va-pollution-suit (describing the violations).
75 See, e.g., FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, supra note 72, at ES-7.
76 Pipeline Incident 20 Year Trends, PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN.,
https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/pipeline-incident-20-year-trends
(click link titled “Significant Incident 20 Year Trend”; then choose “Gas Transmission”
from dropdown).  Significant incidents are those that result in a fatality or injury and cause
$50,000 or more in total costs, among other metrics. Id.
77 See, e.g., Laurence Hammack, Mountain Valley Pipeline to Pay $2.15 Million in Lawsuit
over Environmental Problems, ROANOKE TIMES (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.roanoke.com/
business/mountain-valley-pipeline-to-pay-million-in-lawsuit-over-environmental/arti-
cle_ac54be7e-22ce-5932-a6fd-c9d2763e2e8f.html (noting allegations that a pipeline com-
pany “violat[ed] stormwater control measures more than 300 times during the first year” of
construction, with violations primarily involving erosion of soil from steep slopes during
heavy rains).
78 15 U.S.C. § 717f (2018) (providing that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
must grant a certificate of public convenience and necessity to the pipeline applicant prior
to construction and that the certificate confers eminent domain authority).
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decisionmaking.79  Indeed, although federal approval often takes years to
complete while the government checks off various procedural boxes,80 the
approval of interstate gas pipelines is, ultimately, nearly automatic.81  Local
input is largely limited to the environmental review process required for
these pipelines under the National Environmental Policy Act, in which the
agency must consider alternative routes—which tend to be suggested by local
governments or their constituents.82  The agency need not select any alterna-
tive routes, though.  Rather, it must sufficiently explain why it chose the
route that it ultimately selected.83  Many of the community’s residents
impacted by the pipeline are not compensated for damages despite being
required to accommodate the pipeline.  Landowners who negotiate an ease-
ment with the pipeline company, or are forced to accept an easement
through eminent domain, receive payment for the company’s initial acquisi-
tion of the easement and its use of the easement over time,84 but those who
experience pipeline impacts but do not own land directly affected by the
pipeline receive no compensation.
Federal environmental regulations beyond the National Environmental
Policy Act apply to these pipelines during and after construction, but many
have argued that these regulations are inadequate—particularly with respect
to human health, as demonstrated by rare yet deadly pipeline explosions.85
79 See, e.g., Coleman & Klass, supra note 10, at 682–83 (noting that FERC typically
grants a certificate to the pipeline “so long as the company has contracts to transport gas”);
Statement of Policy, Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities, 88
FERC ¶ 61,227 at 2 (Sept. 15, 1999) (listing as relevant factors competition, the potential
for overbuild, environmental impacts, and the ability to avoid eminent domain).
80 See PAUL W. PARFOMAK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43138, INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS PIPE-
LINES: PROCESS AND TIMING OF FERC PERMIT APPLICATION REVIEW 8 (2015) (citing a GAO
study that found FERC pipeline certificate reviews took an average of 558 days).
81 See Coleman & Klass, supra note 10, at 683 (“FERC has only denied a certificate for
two pipelines in the last thirty years.”).
82 See, e.g., Birckhead v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 925 F.3d 510, 515 (D.C. Cir.
2019) (describing arguments to locate a new natural gas pipeline compressor station far-
ther from a city).
83 See, e.g., id. (concluding that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission considered
and rejected twelve alternative locations for a pipeline compressor station and adequately
supported its selected location).  FERC does typically condition the approval of the pipe-
line construction permit on compliance with all local permits. See PIPELINE PERMITTING,
INTERSTATE NAT. GAS ASS’N OF AM. (2019), https://www.ingaa.org/File.aspx?id=34233&v=
89d18216. But a FERC certificate “preempts any state or local law that duplicates or
obstructs” the federal approval, including preemption of siting or zoning “relevant to the
project.” PARFOMAK, supra note 80, at 5–6. R
84 JOHN ALLEN CHALK, MICHAEL JACOBSON & RICHARD STEHOUWER, PENN STATE EXTEN-
SION, NEGOTIATING PIPELINE RIGHTS-OF-WAY IN PENNSYLVANIA (2015), https://extension.
psu.edu/negotiating-pipeline-rights-of-way-in-pennsylvania.  These easement payments are
taxed as capital gains, so any taxes on landowners associated with the pipeline flow to the
federal government (if capital gains occur). Id.
85 See, e.g., Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Transmission Pipelines: MAOP Reconfirma-
tion, Expansion of Assessment Requirements, and Other Related Amendments, 84 Fed.
Reg. 52,180, 52,180 (Oct. 1, 2019) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 191, 192) (concluding
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Local governments have the most success in slowing pipeline projects once
construction has commenced by engaging in extensive citizen monitoring
and documenting violations of acts such as the Clean Water Act.86  And in
rare cases states have also successfully resisted pipelines—thus sweeping in
local concerns—by using their ability to veto federal approval of the pipeline
due to its impacts on water quality and coastal areas.87  For example, in 2006
Connecticut blocked the proposed “Islander East” natural gas pipeline that
would have run from Connecticut to New York by denying the pipeline com-
pany a certification under the Clean Water Act.88  However, Congress subse-
quently crafted an expedited federal review process for state Clean Water Act
decisions that would delay FERC-approved pipeline or LNG construction.89
Thus, states’ authority to block projects can be quickly challenged and poten-
tially overturned.90  Further, these types of state denials have been the excep-
tion to the norm, leaving local governments with the extreme option of
resisting the pipeline altogether.91
C. Utility-Scale Renewable Energy Development
Other energy industries—particularly the fast-growing areas of utility-
scale wind and solar energy—also have negative effects at the local level in
that “incidents continue to occur on gas pipeline systems resulting in serious risks to life
and property,” including, for example, the San Bruno explosion that killed eight people
and injured fifty-one people).  Recent federal pipeline safety regulations make important
progress in reducing the likelihood of explosion, focusing particularly on testing and
ensuring the integrity of older pipelines. See id. at 52,182.  But past and present safety
regulations do not, for the most part, take into account the specific location of the pipeline,
and the potentially sensitive populations around the pipeline, when addressing safety
issues.  Gosman, supra note 13, at 370 (noting that decisions about safety and siting are
separated in pipeline law, thus “leaving the relationship between the location of a pipeline”
and its risks unaddressed).
86 See supra note 78.
87 States may block pipelines before they are built by refusing certification under the
Clean Water Act that a project will not negatively impact water quality.  33 U.S.C. § 1341
(2018).  They may also refuse to certify a project under the Coastal Zone Management Act
due to its impacts on the state’s coastal zone, although the federal government may ulti-
mately “veto” the state veto.  Ann E. Carlson & Andrew Mayer, Reverse Preemption, 40 ECOL-
OGY L.Q. 583, 585, 598 (2013); Joan M. Darby, Janet M. Robins & Beth L. Webb, The Role of
FERC and the States in Approving and Siting Interstate Natural Gas Facilities and LNG Terminals
After the Energy Policy Act of 2005—Consultation, Preemption and Cooperative Federalism, 6 TEX. J.
OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. 335, 350, 352 (2010).
88 Islander E. Pipeline Co. v. McCarthy, 525 F.3d 141, 142–43 (2d Cir. 2008).
89 Darby et al., supra note 87, at 350.
90 See 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(3) (2018); Darby et al., supra note 87, at 350.
91 But see PIPELINE SAFETY TRUST, LOCAL GOVERNMENT GUIDE TO PIPELINES 13 (1st ed.
2014), http://pstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/PST-Govt-Guide-Pipelines-2014-
web.pdf (“[S]ome local jurisdictions have managed to get some pipeline companies to
voluntarily agree to safety improvements as part of easement or franchise agreements.”).
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addition to positive ones.92  Nearly all new additions of electric generating
capacity are now in the form of large-scale wind, solar, or natural gas
projects.93  During the construction phase of a solar or wind farm, large,
heavy trucks rumble to and from the site, creating pollution and dust.94  Site
constructions, as with pipelines and oil and gas production, also cause soil
erosion.95  These large farms also require hundreds or even thousands of
acres of land,96 and, in the context of wind, they often sit at higher elevations
to take advantage of stronger, steadier winds.97  Although some people find
renewable farms aesthetically pleasing, other residents express alarm at the
prospect of a familiar rural vista transformed into a view of spinning turbines
or shiny solar panels.98  There is no scientific evidence that conclusively
shows negative health effects from wind turbine operations, but some
residents near wind farms also claim to suffer from “shadow flicker”—a
strobe-like shadow produced by spinning turbines that some argue causes
headaches and other health problems.99  Spinning turbines can also be
92 Utility-scale projects have a variety of definitions but generally include projects that
are ten megawatts and larger. Renewable Energy: Utility-Scale Policies and Programs, OFF. OF
ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/eere/slsc/renewable-
energy-utility-scale-policies-and-programs (last visited Sept. 7, 2020).  Distributed energy
projects such as rooftop solar are growing but are dwarfed by the explosion of utility-scale
capacity. See Short-Term Energy Outlook Data Browser, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://
www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/data/browser/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2020) (choose “8b. U.S.
Renewable Electricity Generation and Capacity” from “Standard Tables” dropdown; then
choose “Large-Scale Solar” under “Electric Power Sector Generating Capacity” and “Small-
Scale Solar” under “Other Sectors Generating Capacity”).
93 More than 60% of Electric Generating Capacity Installed in 2018 Was Fueled by Natural
Gas, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.php?id=38632 (showing that in 2018, 19.3 new gigawatts of natural gas, 6.6 new
gigawatts of wind, and 4.9 new gigawatts of solar capacity were added).
94 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 1 FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVI-
RONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON WIND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON BLM-ADMINISTERED
LANDS IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES 5-13 (2005).
95 Id. at 5-4 to 5-5.
96 See, e.g., Uma Outka, The Renewable Energy Footprint, 30 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 241, 243
(2011) (describing disproportionate acreage consumed by renewable energy as compared
to many other forms of energy); Trainor et al., supra note 38, at 1 (same).
97 See ERIC LANTZ, OWEN ROBERTS, JAKE NUNEMAKER, EDGARD DEMEO, KATHERINE DYKES
& GEORGE SCOTT, NATL. RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB’Y, INCREASING WIND TURBINE TOWER
HEIGHTS: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES, at vi (2019) (noting that “[w]ind resource qual-
ity improves significantly with height above ground”).  One can increase height by placing
the turbines on elevated ground and increasing the physical height of the turbine as con-
structed. Id.
98 See, e.g., BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 94, at 5-90 to 5-91 (“It is widely acknowl-
edged that aesthetic impacts are among the most important impacts associated with wind
energy development and operations.”); Ashley Saari, Denial of Wind Project Upheld, MONAD-
NOCK LEDGER-TRANSCRIPT (Aug. 1, 2013), https://www.ledgertranscript.com/Archives/
2013/07/anSECDecision-ml-071113 (discussing residents’ aesthetic objections to construc-
tion of a wind farm).
99 See, e.g., TETRA TECH EC, INC., SHADOW FLICKER IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE ALABAMA
WIND LEDGE FARM 1–2 (2007), https://www.edprnorthamerica.com/wp-content/uploads/
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noisy, and the blinking lights on top of the turbines produce light pollution
at night.100  Those who live near transmission lines that transport electricity
from wind and solar farms worry about the health impacts of electromagnetic
fields, which are relatively small but still raise concerns.101  Further, many
residents dislike the aesthetic impact of large towers and wires required for
long-distance transmission lines.102
Renewable energy development also has costs and benefits that extend
beyond the local level.  Wind and solar energy infrastructure and associated
transmission lines, like oil and gas development, fragment habitats and kill
wildlife.103  With respect to financial benefits, renewable energy companies
are major national employers, and as the industry has boomed, the income
and employment-based effects have been highly positive.104  But as with oil
and gas development, at the local level, these benefits do not always appear
to outweigh the substantial costs experienced within communities.
In contrast with oil and gas production and pipelines, communities are
not broadly preempted from regulating the highly localized effects of utility-
scale wind and solar development.105  Indeed, most states still allow a mean-
ingful amount of local control over this development.106  It is not clear why
states have taken largely opposite approaches to preemption in the oil and
2014/04/ALWF-Shadow-Flicker-Analysis-Report-_V82-V90-G87__edit-TWG-9-27-07_.pdf
(noting health claims but rejecting connections to epileptic seizures).  Despite the lack of
scientific documentation of these effects, residents regularly report them.  This appears to
partially involve the “nocebo” effect, in which residents report health effects from wind
energy development after hearing that they allegedly exist or ascribe existing health condi-
tions to a newly developed project. See Spence, supra note 27, at 366.
100 See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 94, at 4-11, 5-94 to 5-95.
101 See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., ESTABLISHING A DIALOGUE ON RISKS FROM ELECTRO-
MAGNETIC FIELDS 5 (2002), https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/42543/
9241545712_eng.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&ua=1 (placing the risk from low-frequency
electromagnetic fields in the same category as coffee and its potential link to kidney can-
cer); id. at 9–10 (noting “considerable” opposition to transmission lines for health rea-
sons); Spence, New Politics, supra note 27, at 354–55 (same).
102 See, e.g., Lita Furby, Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff & Robin Gregory, Public Perceptions
of Electric Power Transmission Lines, 8 J. ENV’T PSYCH. 19, 19, 25–26 (1988) (noting opposi-
tion to power lines due to their aesthetic impacts, among other objections).
103 See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 94, at 5-3 to 5-4 (noting the land and habitat
disturbed by wind farm sites and access roads); id. at 5-53 to 5-56 (describing bird and
other wildlife fatalities caused by wind farm operation); U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., LAND-
BASED WIND ENERGY GUIDELINES 1 (2012), https://www.fws.gov/ecological-services/es-
library/pdfs/WEG_final.pdf.
104 See, e.g., E. LANTZ, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB’Y, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BENE-
FITS FROM WIND POWER IN NEBRASKA: A REPORT FOR THE NEBRASKA ENERGY OFFICE 2 (2009),
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy09osti/44344.pdf (concluding that “the development and
construction of 7,800 MW of wind energy in Nebraska . . . will support 26,000 to 36,500
construction-period jobs” as well as create “a boost in economic activity ranging from $140
million to $260 million” from construction-related activity).
105 See DuVivier & Witt, supra note 40, at 1463 (“[M]any states that have statewide siting
for almost all other sources of electricity generation do not cover wind.”).
106 See Outka, supra note 14, at 978–81.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-2\NDL203.txt unknown Seq: 21  1-DEC-20 13:47
2020] taxing  local  energy  externalities 583
gas and renewable energy contexts.  One explanation could be that the oil
and gas lobby has nearly a half-century-old connection with state legislatures
and governors, whereas the renewable lobby—although strong, particularly
in the wind context—is newer.107  Another might be that many of the large
oil and gas producing states are predominantly Republican, and Republican
legislatures are more likely to preempt local limits on oil and gas than local
bans or other limits on renewable energy development.108  This explanation
would require more nuance, though, because some heavily Republican
states, such as Texas, are leaders in renewable energy.  The Texas Legislature
spurred massive wind development in Texas by requiring transmission lines
to be built from windy areas of the state to “load centers”—cities with the
highest electricity demand.109
The relatively weak state preemption of local control over renewables is
not the result of local support for renewable development.  There is a wide-
spread local movement to resist wind development, in particular, and it has
had a notable degree of success.110  Local governments have fully banned
and placed moratoria on wind and solar farms, denied individual projects,
issued resolutions opposing any further renewable energy development in
the community, and imposed stringent setbacks that make renewable energy
development difficult, among other measures.111  This demonstrates how
local control over energy can go too far, in that it blocks needed infrastruc-
ture for generating electricity—in this case, electricity that is cheaper than
107 In some states, there has long been a “revolving door” between state oil and gas
conservation commissions—once primarily tasked with ensuring that when drilling
occurred, as much oil or gas would be produced as possible—and the oil and gas industry.
See, e.g., Dave Fehling, Revolving Door: Oil & Gas Companies Hire Former Texas Regulators,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO: STATE IMPACT (June 12, 2012), https://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/
2012/06/12/revolving-door-oil-gas-companies-hire-former-texas-regulators/ (noting indi-
viduals in industry who previously worked at the Texas Railroad Commission).
108 Texas, Pennsylvania, Louisiana, and Oklahoma were the top producers of natural
gas in 2018.  Pennsylvania is the only blue state among these.  Susan Milligan, The Battle-
ground States: Pennsylvania, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.usnews.com/news/
elections/articles/the-2020-swing-states-pennsylvania-who-votes-past-results-and-why-it-mat-
ters (describing Pennsylvania as a traditionally “blue” state); Natural Gas Annual Supply &
Disposition by State, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/
ng_sum_snd_a_EPG0_FPD_Mmcf_a.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2020). See also; OKLA. STAT.
tit. 52, § 137.1 (2020) (showing preemption of most local regulation of oil and gas develop-
ment Oklahoma); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 81.0523 (West 2019) (same for Texas). See
also Briffault, supra note 18, 1997–98 (observing that although Democratic state legisla-
tures have preempted local action in some areas, “the preponderance of new preemption
actions and proposals have been advanced by Republican-dominated state governments”).
109 See Commission Staff’s Petition for Designation of Competitive Renewable-Energy
Zones, Docket No. 33672 (Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex. Oct. 7, 2008) (order on rehearing),
http://www.ettexas.com/Content/documents/PUCTFinalOrderonCREZPlan100708.pdf.
110 DuVivier & Witt, supra note 40, at 1462–63.
111 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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most other generation sources112 and is key to addressing increasingly criti-
cal climate challenges.113
D. Liquefied Natural Gas Terminals
In terms of the degree of local authority to address energy externalities,
liquefied natural gas terminals fall between oil and gas production and pipe-
lines, for which there is very little local control, and utility-scale renewable
energy development, for which local control remains surprisingly strong.
In order to efficiently import (or, as is now more common, export) natu-
ral gas, it must be cooled to a very low temperature and liquefied.  Compa-
nies are currently constructing more export terminals, and approval of more
terminals is underway.  The terminals tend to be located near the coasts for
ease of exporting the gas, and, as with other energy infrastructure analyzed in
this Article, tend to have primarily localized effects.  Tanks can breach and
release liquefied natural gas, thus impacting coastal land and water
resources.  The impact of the spill would primarily relate to potential fire
impacts, because LNG, when spilled, completely dissipates and “leaves no res-
idue.”114  The larger localized risk is therefore the threat of explosion and
fires.  In a rare yet relatively extreme event, LNG facilities can cause “fireball
type burning which occurs when a vapor cloud . . . is ignited.”115 These “cata-
strophic” explosions can cause deaths and injury near where they occur.116
Other effects of LNG terminals, which fall primarily locally, include noise, air
pollution, and aesthetic and visual impacts, as with other energy struc-
tures.117  Impacts that fall both locally and more broadly include potential
pollution to surface water due to dredging and filling of coastal land, wildlife
112 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LEVELIZED COST AND LEVELIZED AVOIDED COST OF NEW
GENERATION RESOURCES IN THE Annual Energy Outlook 2020, at 3, 7 (2020), https://
www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/electricity_generation.pdf.
113 See IPCC, supra note 41, at 134.
114 CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32205, LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS (LNG) IMPORT TERMINALS:
SITING, SAFETY, AND REGULATION 6 (2009).
115 TECH. & MGMT. SYS., INC., SPECTRUM OF FIRES IN AN LNG FACILITY, at E-2 (2006)
(writing for the U.S. Department of Transportation), https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/
matrix/FilGet.rdm?fil=3133&s=72433F9E0D234D9ABACA8AF81103CADD&c=1.
116 GRAHAM ATKINSON, JONATHAN HALL & ALISON MCGILLIVRAY, HEALTH & SAFETY
EXEC., REVIEW OF VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION INCIDENTS, RR 1113, at 82 (2017) (UK),
https://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrpdf/rr1113.pdf (describing these types of cata-
strophic explosions); CONGR. RSCH. SERV., supra note 114, at 4 (noting deaths at and near
LNG facilities abroad and a U.S. LNG facility in 1944). But see PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FAILURE INVESTIGATION REPORT—LIQUE-
FIED NATURAL GAS (LNG) PEAK SHAVING PLANT, PLYMOUTH, WASHINGTON 1–2 (2016),
https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/FIR_and_APPENDICES_
PHMSA_WUTC_Williams_Plymouth_2016_04_28_REDACTED.pdf (noting a catastrophic
explosion at an LNG facility that only sent debris to nearby railroad tracks).
117 See, e.g., 1 FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, TEXAS LNG PROJECT: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT, at ES-4 (2019), https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/vol-
ume-I.pdf (listing these and other impacts).
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and wetlands impacts, and interference with recreational opportunities on
the portion of the coast occupied by the terminal.118
Local governments enjoy some authority over the LNG terminal siting
process because the federal government preempts local control over the
approval and siting of an energy project but requires some developer bar-
gaining with the state government, largely on local governments’ behalf.119
The federal government requires the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
to consult with the state regarding safety considerations associated with the
facility, including, for example, the size of the population near the proposed
facility, existing land uses, emergency response capabilities, and “the need to
encourage remote siting.”120  The federal government also allows the state,
on local governments’ behalf, to submit an “advisory report” with state and
local safety considerations, which the Commission must specifically respond
to before approving the terminal.121
As with natural gas pipelines, states—potentially acting on behalf of local
governments—can also use other environmental acts to block an LNG termi-
nal, including a refusal to certify that the project will not affect state water
quality under the Clean Water Act.122  But also as with pipelines, project
developers may receive expedited federal review of denials of water quality
certifications, and courts may override these denials.123  States also may block
federal approval of an LNG terminal under the Coastal Zone Management
Act, but the government may override this state veto.124
The following Part provides a framework of the available tools for
preventing or mitigating local negative externalities in these contexts and
offers examples of the circumstances in which communities have deployed
these tools.  It also documents state policies that increasingly block local use
of these tools, thus causing a regulatory void.
II. LOCAL GOVERNANCE TOOLS AND THE REGULATORY VOID
Local governments have a wide range of tools available to address exter-
nalities, from inaction to relatively detailed intervention.  A Pigouvian
approach to externalities would suggest that local governments should force
industry to internalize externalities through regulation, a “polluter pays” tax
or similar fiscal mechanisms, or liability.125  Under a Coasean approach, pri-
vate individuals or governments would negotiate with industry as an alterna-
tive to governmental intervention to address externalities.126  And under the
118 See, e.g., id.
119 15 U.S.C. § 717b-1 (2018). But see Darby et al., supra note 87, at 343 (“[C]ourts have
rejected attempts by states to subject natural gas projects to state or local laws . . . .”).
120 15 U.S.C. § 717b-1.
121 Id.
122 See supra note 87.
123 Darby et al., supra note 87, at 350.
124 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (2018).
125 See, e.g., Coase, supra note 2, at 1–2 (characterizing the Pigouvian approach).
126 Id. at 2–8 (describing how a pricing system could address damages).
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Calabresi-Melamed framing of Coasean bargaining, the type of bargaining
would depend on who had the initial entitlement—whether local govern-
ments had the right to block development or not—and what type of entitle-
ment it was.  If local governments had the right to block development and
industry had to bargain with the governments for a subjectively determined
price, this would be a property approach.127  Under a liability approach,
industry could force local governments to allow development at a predeter-
mined price.128  And under an extreme “inalienability” form of entitlement,
local governments could not block development, and they would not receive
any payment when development occurred.129
Local entitlements to block energy industries with highly localized exter-
nalities fall primarily in the category of a property entitlement, where they
exist.  For example, for wind energy, at least twenty-two states give local gov-
ernments primary authority over wind energy development, and at least
twenty-one other states give local governments some authority over this devel-
opment.130  Although only a subset of these states allow local governments to
ban renewable energy, local governments in many states still retain this
extreme option.131  In these cases, local governments are able to address the
externalities that they experience through bans, or, more moderately,
through regulation, taxation, or other tools.132  Indeed, this local authority
might be too broad, in that it impedes what is increasingly viewed as a critical
type of energy development.133  The broad local authority to regulate and
tax also gives renewable energy developers a strong incentive to come to the
table to negotiate with the local government.  LNG terminals represent a very
weak liability entitlement for local governments, which may not block the
terminal but can slow its progress by commenting on safety concerns in the
approval process.134
In other areas of energy law, particularly for some oil and gas develop-
ment and all interstate natural gas pipelines, local governments lack any enti-
127 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 3, at 1091–92.
128 Id.
129 See id. at 1092–93.
130 See Outka, supra note 14, at 981 (noting forty-eight states with significant local con-
trol over wind energy siting); Jaclyn Kahn & Laura Shields, State Approaches to Wind Facility
Siting, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/
research/energy/state-wind-energy-siting.aspx (for wind energy, showing states with for
which local governments control siting).
131 See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 218 P.3d 400, 405–06, 430 (Kan.
2009) (affirming a county ban on large-scale wind energy development); Outka, supra note
14, at 978–79 (noting local bans and moratoria on wind energy projects); Sammy Roth,
California’s San Bernardino County Slams the Brakes on Big Solar Projects, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 28,
2019), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-san-bernardino-solar-renewable-energy-
20190228-story.html (noting bans in California’s largest county); Sarah Trafton, Solar Sup-
porters Sue Town, REGISTER-STAR (Hudson), Apr. 30, 2019, at A1 (noting opposition to a
New York town’s ban on most solar farms).
132 See infra Sections II.A–D.
133 See IPCC, supra note 41, at 96–97 (showing the need for renewables).
134 See 15 U.S.C. § 717b-1 (2018).
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tlement because they are preempted from regulating this development and
do not receive any compensation for being forced to allow energy develop-
ment. 135  In a way, industry therefore has a nearly inalienable entitlement.
Local governments receive indirect revenue as a result of the development
that they must accommodate, primarily in the form of property taxes, and a
small distribution from state taxes on oil and gas development.136  But these
revenues are not Pigouvian—they are not tailored to make up the difference
between the value of an activity to the party engaged in that activity and the
value to society.137  Thus, the taxes are blunt tools, at best, for addressing
externalities.  For example, in Ohio, the local taxable value of oil and gas is
established under a state-specified formula.138  And in Texas, which allows
for local property taxation, the state caps the amount by which an overall
county property tax rate may increase.139  The legislature and governor have
proposed further limits.140  Further, given local governments’ lack of entitle-
ment, there is little room for Coasean bargaining for damages unless industry
is incentivized to negotiate for reasons of good will or risk aversion.  Energy
companies operating within the community might have a firm commitment
to a “social license to operate,”141 so to speak, or they might fear common-
law litigation or future regulation at the state level.
This Part explores the full range of tools that would be available to
address the local externalities of energy development if local governments
were unconstrained by preemption, which often precludes Pigouvian solu-
tions and consequently limits Coasean bargaining options.
A. Regulation
A common way to address the potential externalities from a proposed
industrial activity is to regulate the activity to prevent or limit the externalities
produced.  As discussed here, many states preempt local governments in the
oil and gas production context, and all local governments are preempted
135 See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
136 See, e.g., HEADWATERS ECON., HOW TEXAS RETURNS “UNCONVENTIONAL” OIL REVENUE
TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 5 (2014), https://headwaterseconomics.org/wp-content/
uploads/state-energy-policies-tx.pdf (noting an ad valorem tax on oil and gas equipment
and mineral reserves); Ohio Oil and Gas Real Property Taxation, OHIO DEP’T OF TAX’N,
https://tax.ohio.gov/wps/portal/gov/tax/government/real-state/oilgas (last visited Sept.
6, 2020) (showing that oil and gas reserves are taxed as real property by counties).
137 See PIGOU, supra note 2, at 150.
138 Ohio Oil and Gas Real Property Taxation, supra note 136.
139 See TEX. ASS’N OF CNTYS., COUNTY REVENUE CAPS RESTRICT LOCAL SERVICES 2 (2019),
https://www.county.org/TAC/media/TACMedia/Legislative/Legislative-Brief/Revenue-
Caps-Jan-2019.pdf (describing the cap).
140 See Scharff, Preemption and Fiscal Authority, supra note 20, at 1282–83 (describing
other Texas proposals to limit local property tax authority).
141 Jim Cooney, Reflections on the 20th Anniversary of the Term ‘Social Licence,’ 35 J. ENERGY
& NAT. RES. L. 197 (describing “social license” as a term that came to prominence in 1997
“to describe the challenge that mining companies face in building relationships with com-
munities located around their projects”).
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from regulating natural gas pipelines.  This preemption would not be prob-
lematic if state and federal regulations adequately addressed the externali-
ties, but they only do so partially.
1. Federal and State Regulation That Incidentally Addresses Local
Externalities
State and federal governments regulate the effects of some industries
with very localized harms because some of the harms spill beyond local bor-
ders or otherwise implicate state and national interests.142  For example,
Clean Air Act regulation of air pollutant emissions from natural gas wells
controls “volatile organic compounds,” a group of pollutants that includes
methane, which is a heat-trapping gas with globalized effects on climate.143
By limiting this group of pollutants, these regulations also happen to reduce
odors and haze at the local level.144  Recent federal regulations also
addressed some air pollution from pipelines, but the EPA removed these
requirements in 2020.145
Regulation of energy projects under the Endangered Species Act also
incidentally addresses local impacts.  Energy developers are prohibited from
“taking” (harming) endangered species or their habitats under the Act,
except with express permission from the Fish and Wildlife Service, with con-
ditions attached.146  These conditions often include habitat protection provi-
sions that also serve to preserve open space, and, potentially, important local
landscapes.
Despite some coverage of local externalities by state and federal regula-
tion, state and federal officials lack the incentive or authority to address many
other local effects and are often not the best entities to address these effects.
Broad-brush, higher-level regulations are unlikely to fully capture the
nuances of local problems even though they have some beneficial spillover
effects for communities.  For example, although protection of habitat under
142 See, e.g., WIS. ADMIN. CODE PUB. SERV. COMM’N § 128-15 (2020) (controlling shadow
flicker, among other wind energy externalities); U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note
103, at 54–55 (providing guidance for minimizing bird and bat deaths caused by wind
turbines).
143 See, e.g., Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed,
and Modified Sources, 81 Fed. Reg. 35,824, 35,825 (June 3, 2016) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
60) (regulating methane (greenhouse gas) emissions from hydraulically fractured oil and
gas wells).
144 See id. at 35,827.
145 Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modi-
fied Sources Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 57,018 (Sept. 14, 2020) (codified at 40. C.F.R. pt. 60)
(eliminating volatile organic compound (VOC) and methane regulations for the pipeline
and storage sectors of oil and gas).
146 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (2018); U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS
UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (2011), https://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-
library/pdf/hcp.pdf (explaining that Habitat Conservation Plans are required to obtain an
incidental take permit and that these Plans must include minimization or mitigation of
species impacts).
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the Endangered Species Act might incidentally preserve a treasured local
view, this Act is not designed with landscape and aesthetic protection in
mind, and local resources that do not happen to house an endangered or
threatened species will not benefit from it.  Similarly, federal and state air
pollution regulations do not fully cover localized air pollution effects.147
2. Direct Regulation by Local Governments
As introduced above, local governments can and sometimes do directly
regulate the harms of energy development—particularly in the case of renew-
able energy development.  In states where local governments are not pre-
empted from regulating, they do the same for oil and gas development.
Requirements for repairing roads damaged by heavy trucks traveling to and
from sites, fencing or landscaping around development sites,148 limiting the
acceptable decibel limit a certain distance from the sites,149 limiting the
hours of construction, and avoiding pollution during construction are com-
mon in both the renewable energy context and (where allowed) the oil and
gas context.150
Although local governments control energy externalities in some juris-
dictions, a growing number of states preempt local authority to varying
degrees, particularly in the oil and gas production context.151  The Ohio
Supreme Court interpreted Ohio’s statutory preemption provision to block
even seemingly minor requirements such as requiring oil and gas operators
to hold public hearings before drilling a well and to post a modest bond.152
And a federal court, hearing a state preemption case under diversity jurisdic-
tion, found that Louisiana law prevented Shreveport from banning oil and
gas development within 1000 feet of the city’s drinking water supply.153
147 See, e.g., DALE WELLS, COLO. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH & ENV’T, CONDENSATE TANK
EMISSIONS 2 (2012), https://www3.epa.gov/ttnchie1/conference/ei20/session6/
dwells.pdf (noting that oil and gas tanks were a primary cause of air quality problems in
Colorado’s Front Range).
148 See, e.g., FORT WORTH, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 15-43 (2009), http://
library.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Texas/ftworth_tx/cityoffortworthtexascode
ofordinances/partiicitycode/chapter15gas?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:
fortworth_tx$anc=JD_Chapter15 (providing fencing and landscaping requirements for
well sites).
149 See, e.g., Rindge, N.H., Small Wind Energy System Ordinance (Mar. 12, 2013) (limit-
ing decibel levels near small wind energy systems); FORT WORTH, TEX., CODE OF ORDI-
NANCES § 15-42(b)(2)(a) (2009) (limiting decibel levels near oil and gas sites).
150 See, e.g., Benton County, Ind., Ordinance for Regulating Energy Generation Using
Wind Power in Benton County, Indiana (Mar. 7, 2006) (requiring approval of a drainage
plan before construction can begin).
151 For discussion of the general trend toward increasingly aggressive state preemption
of local power, see, for example, Briffault, supra note 18; Schragger, supra note 18.
152 State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 37 N.E.3d 128, 132–33, 137–38 (Ohio
2015).
153 Energy Mgmt. Corp. v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 297, 299–300 (5th Cir. 2005).
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Texas and Oklahoma prevent local governments from regulating most stages
of oil and gas development, with limited exceptions.154
Preemption of local energy regulations leads some local governments to
resort to unusual regulatory measures, adopting seemingly overly stringent
conditions on development within the very narrow regulatory sphere in
which they may operate.  In Mustang, Oklahoma, for instance, town officials
used their very limited oil and gas regulatory authority to require a sixteen-
foot sound barrier around a proposed well site and to limit trucks traveling to
and from the site to two roads.155
3. Local Land Use Regulation
Another common type of local regulation to address localized effects—
but one that is increasingly preempted—is the use of land use controls such
as zoning regulations to address negative externalities of industry.  Through
zoning, local governments carve their territory into districts in which certain
types of land uses are permitted, permitted with conditions, or prohibited.
Governments sometimes designate specific districts in which oil and gas or
wind energy development is allowed or prohibited, or require the establish-
ment of a special energy-based zoning district.156
Several state governments have preempted local land use authority over
energy development, particularly in oil and gas.  Pennsylvania went so far as
to require local governments to allow oil and gas development in all zoning
districts,157 although this was ultimately deemed to violate the state constitu-
tion.158  An Ohio Supreme Court opinion, interpreting general state lan-
guage preempting local regulation of oil and gas activity, refused to
differentiate between local direct controls on oil and gas development and
land use controls, finding that all were preempted.159  Similarly, when a local
government tried to prevent an interstate natural gas pipeline from being
placed within a designated floodplain, the court concluded that the regula-
tion was likely preempted by federal pipeline siting authority.160
There have been some exceptions to land-use-based preemption in oil
and gas, however.  In New York, despite express state preemption of local
154 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 137.1 (2020); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 81.0523(b) (West
2019).
155 Traci Chapman, Plans to Drill in Mustang Halted, MUSTANG TIMES (Dec. 13, 2017),
https://www.centraloklahomaweeklies.com/2017/12/13/plans-to-drill-in-mustang-halted/.
156 See, e.g., Cecil Township, Pa., Ordinance 3-2011 (Sept. 6, 2011) (repealed Dec. 5,
2011) (establishing an Oil and Gas Recovery Overlay District in which drilling must occur);
SANTA FE CNTY., N.M., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. xv, § 150.02, Exhibit B, § 5 (2008) (requir-
ing an Oil and Gas Overlay District Classification before drilling can occur).
157 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3304(a) (2012), invalidated by Robinson Twp. v. Common-
wealth, 83 A.3d 901, 913 (Pa. 2013).
158 Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 913.
159 State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 37 N.E.3d 128, 135–37 (Ohio 2015).
160 Atl. Coast Pipeline v. Nelson Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 18-cv-00115, 2019 WL
2570530, at *7 (W.D. Va. June 21, 2019).
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regulation of oil and gas development, the state’s highest court concluded
that the legislation does not preempt local land use controls on this develop-
ment—even controls that prohibit drilling and fracking altogether.161
As introduced above, local governments enjoy relatively broad land use
powers over renewable energy development, including the power to use land
use controls to ban or place a moratorium on development.  And court opin-
ions have, in part, been favorable to local land use control over renewable
energy.  For example, the Kansas Supreme Court allowed a county to pro-
hibit all large wind farms throughout the county in its zoning code,162 and in
New York a federal district court affirmed the validity of a town’s two-year
moratorium on wind energy development.163  Counties and municipalities in
states such as Indiana and California have also banned or placed moratoria
on wind farms or renewable projects generally.164  Additionally, courts have
allowed local governments to deny conditional use permits to wind energy
projects,165 and a Pennsylvania court affirmed the validity of various restric-
tions placed on a wind project by a zoning hearing board, including, for
example, increased setbacks.166
This is not to say, however, that local governments enjoy unfettered con-
trol over renewable energy development.  Several states place a regulatory
ceiling on local regulation of wind farms, providing statewide regulation of
issues such as the height of wind equipment and setbacks from nearby build-
ings and preventing local governments from imposing more stringent lim-
its.167  A federal court in Michigan denied the validity of a two-year
moratorium on wind energy development,168 and the Oklahoma Supreme
161 Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188, 1203 (N.Y. 2014).
162 Zimmerman v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 218 P.3d 400, 405–06, 430 (Kan. 2009).
163 Ecogen, LLC v. Town of Italy, 438 F. Supp. 2d 149, 162 (W.D.N.Y. 2006).
164 See Mark Peterson, Marshall County First to Ban Wind Farms, NAT’L WIND WATCH (May
20, 2013), https://www.wind-watch.org/news/2013/05/20/marshall-county-first-to-ban-
wind-farms-2/; Documents Filed Under Zoning/Planning from USA, supra note 28 (describing
bans and other limits).
165 Tuscola Wind III, LLC v. Almer Charter Twp., No. 17-cv-10497, 2017 WL 5022640,
at *1 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 3, 2017).
166 PPM Atl. Renewable v. Fayette Cnty. Zoning Hearing Bd., No. 1431 C.D. 2010, 2014
WL 2156744, at *1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 20, 2014).
167 See, e.g., WIS. ADMIN. CODE PUB. SERV. COMM’N § 128-10(1) (2020).  New York, New
Hampshire, and Wyoming similarly allow local governments to regulate certain aspects of
wind energy development but place state restrictions on this regulation. N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 674:63 (2020) (prohibiting local ordinances that restrict wind energy development
in ways deemed unreasonable by the state); ENV’T L. INST., STATE ENABLING LEGISLATION
FOR COMMERCIAL-SCALE WIND POWER SITING AND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ROLE 8–9 (2011),
https://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/eli-pubs/d21-02.pdf (describing New York and
Wyoming regulations).  Four states wholly preempt local authority over large commercial
wind projects, and eleven states preempt local authority over projects that exceed a thresh-
old size.  Outka, supra note 14, at 982 & n.266.
168 Tuscola Wind III, LLC v. Ellington Twp., No. 17-cv-11025, 2018 WL 1291161, at *1,
*9 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 13, 2018).
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Court rejected a town’s denial of a conditional use permit for a wind farm.169
Additionally, in Wisconsin, when a county tried to use its zoning powers to set
uniform “setback, height and noise requirements” on small and large wind
energy projects, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals deemed this approach pre-
empted.170  Further, a local government’s objection to the Ohio Power Siting
Board’s decision to allow the construction of a wind farm failed in court.171
As compared to oil and gas development, however, many of the state
preemptive regulations for wind energy development are more sensitive to
local concerns.  For example, although Wisconsin prohibits local govern-
ments from implementing ordinances stricter than the state statute, the state
requires wind energy developers to mitigate a variety of local effects.172  The
state requires wind farm owners to prevent and mitigate shadow flicker—the
shadow cast by moving blades—experienced by people in nearby residences
and “occupied community building[s].”173
In summary, local governments in some states are able to use regulation
to address the highly localized effects of energy development.  But in many
states, particularly for oil and gas production and natural gas pipeline devel-
opment, local governments lack the regulatory tools needed to address
important impacts.
B. Tort Law
In the absence of regulatory power—or in addition to it—local govern-
ments can look to the courts for solutions to localized externalities.  Govern-
ments may argue that proposed industrial development will constitute a
public nuisance or that existing development has created one.  But nuisance
does not systematically cover local impacts, and this is the case for most forms
of energy development.  For example, in many states, visual impacts—such as
those created by wind energy—do not constitute a nuisance unless combined
with other, more measurable effects such as noise.174  And in some cases
highly localized impacts are too localized to constitute interference with a
“public right”—a necessary element for public nuisance claims.175  For exam-
169 Mustang Run Wind Project, LLC v. Osage Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 387 P.3d 333,
335–36, 347 (Okla. 2016).
170 Ecker Bros. v. Calumet Cnty., 772 N.W.2d 240, 242, 245, 247 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009).
171 In re Application of Champaign Wind, L.L.C., 58 N.E.3d 1142, 1147 (Ohio 2016).
172 See WIS. ADMIN. CODE PUB. SERV. COMM’N § 128.03 (2020) (prohibiting local ordi-
nances that are more restrictive than the state code); id. § 128.14 (requiring developers to
mitigate local noise effects).
173 Id. §§ 128.15(1)–(3).
174 See, e.g., Laubenstein v. Bode Tower, L.L.C., 392 P.3d 706, 709, 711 (Okla. 2016)
(holding that individual’s objection to the visual impacts of a cell tower and associated
warning lights was not an actionable nuisance); Rankin v. FPL Energy, LLC, 266 S.W.3d
506, 511–12 (Tex. App. 2008) (holding emotional harm due to the unsightliness of a wind
energy facility not to constitute a nuisance).
175 The courts vary widely in their application of public nuisance principles.  Some
require allegations of relatively widespread harm. See, e.g., Fisher v. Zumwalt, 61 P. 82, 82
(Cal. 1900) (holding that public nuisance “is confined in most cases to where there has
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ple, if a local government were concerned about chemical spills migrating
offsite from one hydraulically fractured oil and gas well to a private property,
this might be inadequate to support a public nuisance claim absent a show-
ing that the chemicals might leach underground into groundwater or other-
wise impact shared resources.  As one state court has observed, interference
with a “public right” must “deprive all members of the community of a right
to some resource to which they otherwise are entitled,”176 and an activity
cannot be deemed to interfere with a public right “merely because it inter-
feres with the use and enjoyment of land by a large number of persons.”177
Thus, even seemingly widespread harms, such as exposure to lead paint, have
in some cases been deemed insufficient to constitute an actionable public
nuisance.178
Private lawsuits could, of course, pick up some of the slack in the event
that alleged nuisances from industries with highly localized effects did not
adequately impact public rights.  But these lawsuits often address harms only
suffered by individual landowners, thus requiring a large collection of indi-
vidual efforts to address harms shared by many community members.  Fur-
ther, even these individual lawsuits have, by and large, been unsuccessful for
several local harm-producing activities.179  In the oil and gas context, this is
partly due to the challenge of proving or even adequately pleading causation.
For example, it is difficult for private plaintiffs, who often lack access to
sophisticated scientific data, to show that pollution in a local water source
came from a specific oil and gas well.180  Private plaintiffs’ objections to wind
been an invasion of a right which is common to every person in the community, and not to
where the wrong has been done to private property”); State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d
428, 453 (R.I. 2008) (making a similar holding to Zumwalt); Denise E. Antolini, Moderniz-
ing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 771
(2001) (“The key element to a public nuisance claim . . . is that the annoyance, inconve-
nience, or injury must be to a public right or interest (e.g., a public road or beach), not
just a private one.” (emphasis omitted)).  Others allow relatively localized harms to count.
See, e.g., Capitol Props. Grp., LLC v. 1247 Ctr. St., LLC, 770 N.W.2d 105, 110 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2009) (finding sufficient allegations of fact to state a claim for public nuisance when a
landlord alleged that noise from one nightclub exceeded a certain decibel level); Robert
Abrams & Val Washington, The Misunderstood Law of Public Nuisance: A Comparison with Pri-
vate Nuisance Twenty Years After Boomer, 54 ALB. L. REV. 359, 384 (1990) (“Although an
aggregate of private nuisances is sometimes said not to constitute a public nuisance, the
better-reasoned case law and scholarly opinion suggest otherwise.” (footnotes omitted)).
176 Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 453.
177 Id. (quoting 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. g (AM. L. INST. 1977)).
178 Id.
179 See, e.g., WATSON, supra note 21, at 6–9 (showing numerous cases dismissed,
although many also settled).
180 See, e.g., Ely v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., No. 09-CV-2284, 2017 WL 1196510, at *1
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2017) (finding that plaintiffs’ evidence “relied in some measure upon
tenuous inferences”); Tucker v. Sw. Energy Co., No. 11-cv-44, No. 11-cv-45, 2012 WL
528253, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 17, 2012) (holding that “[g]eneral statements about the
many dangerous substances used in fracking, and conclusory statements about the migra-
tion of those substances, will not suffice” for the purposes of causation).
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farms have also often been struck down on the grounds that they are lodged
solely in aesthetic objections or that they lack proof of health effects.181  Fur-
ther, even successful private lawsuits are unlikely to comprehensively address
local governments’ community-wide concerns, since private litigants are
often only motivated to address their own harms.  And private plaintiffs with
more civic-minded motivations often lack standing to address broader harms.
C. Monetary Tools, Including Taxes
Communities that are unable to force or incentivize industry internaliza-
tion of local externalities through regulation or liability have another poten-
tial solution in their quiver.  They may tax or otherwise attach a monetary
obligation to the use of land, equipment, and other goods and services associ-
ated with that activity and use the revenues to address impacts.  As with liabil-
ity, this is an ex post solution, which provides methods of addressing or
offsetting the harm that has occurred.  But also similar to liability, depending
on their amount and design, taxes and other monetary tools can decrease the
level of industrial activity within communities or change how the activity pro-
ceeds.  Indeed, if these tools are tailored to address externalities directly,
Pigouvian-type “polluter pays” taxes might allow relatively high levels of
development while simultaneously reducing the externalities of that develop-
ment, depending on the cost of such reduction.
1. Defining Taxes, Fees, Exactions, and Bonds
This Article refers broadly to “monetary tools” as a Pigouvian measure
because government revenues to address externalities come from a variety of
sources and are not strictly defined as taxes.  The term “tax” typically refers to
an instrument that applies to all entities within a jurisdiction that meet cer-
tain characteristics, such as all entities and persons who own property or pro-
duce oil and gas.  A tax also applies regardless of whether the payer benefits
from the revenue generated by the tax, and it is involuntary.  Anyone who
meets the characteristics associated with the tax must pay it unless the person
falls within an exempted category.182
Exactions, in contrast, apply to entities and individuals who choose to
benefit from the governmental service funded by the fee, such as water or
sewer infrastructure that serves a new housing subdivision.  The benefits, in
turn, accrue primarily to those who have paid the fee.183  Exactions typically
181 See, e.g., Rankin v. FPL Energy, LLC, 266 S.W.3d 506, 511–12 (Tex. App. 2008).
182 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 565–66 (2012) (taking a
relatively lax “functional” approach to the distinction between taxes, penalties, and other
instruments); Home Builders & Contractors Ass’n of Palm Beach Cnty., Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs, 446 So. 2d 140, 144–45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (describing tests to distinguish
taxes from fees); Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the “Get What You Pay
for” Model of Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 379–80 (2004) (distinguishing taxes
from fees and describing the case law).
183 Reynolds, supra note 182, at 380.
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refer to a variety of mechanisms that require developers of new land uses,
such as commercial developments or housing subdivisions, to pay for or oth-
erwise ensure the provision of the new infrastructure necessary to support
these land uses.  They also refer to fees for new infrastructure provided to
existing land uses.184
Another revenue-based mechanism—the bond—is a financial tool that
bridges the tax-impact fee divide.  A bond involves a company putting money
down—or providing another financial assurance—before engaging in an
activity, and promising to allow the government to use that money if the com-
pany fails to meet its obligations.185  For example, before drilling an oil and
gas well, a company typically must post a bond to ensure that if the company
does not properly fill in the well when it is done producing, the government
can use the bond money to do this.186  Wind energy developers must post
similar bonds for decommissioning.187  But unlike taxes, bonds do not auto-
matically generate revenues to be spent by the government; rather, they are
targeted specifically at one activity.  And the government takes and uses the
bond money only if the company fails to meet certain obligations associated
with the activity.
Beyond their different technical labels, monetary tools vary along several
dimensions that affect the extent to which they address local externalities.
These include the object of the tool, the externality or the value of property,
goods, or services to which the tool applies; the timing of the tax, both in
terms of when money is paid and when revenues may be spent; and the loca-
tion of monetary collection and allocation of the associated revenue, among
other differences.  The following subsections provide a framework for under-
standing these tools in terms of their ability to raise revenue that could
184 Exactions are also often defined as a general category that includes impact fees and
other tools such as concurrency requirements—a mandate that if developers wish to build
new projects, such as commercial or housing developments, they must ensure that there
are adequate services and infrastructure to support that development. See, e.g., Jim Rossi &
Christopher Serkin, Energy Exactions, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 643, 644–45 (2019).  Impact fees
are “one-time charges assessed against new development projects to help finance the cost
of public improvements necessitated by those projects.”  Michael B. Kent, Jr., Theoretical
Tension and Doctrinal Discord: Analyzing Development Impact Fees as Takings, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1833, 1836 (2010).  Some scholars and practitioners specifically separate exactions
from impact fees, defining exactions as fees placed on projects as a condition precedent to
project approval and impact fees as fees that are simply charged “outright” as part of the
project.  Reynolds, supra note 182, at 415–16.
185 See, e.g., David W. Kash & John C. Yi, Deconstructing Subdivision Bonds, DEF. COUNS. J.,
Jan. 2012, at 87, 87 (noting surety bond requirements for housing developers to provide an
assurance that a housing subdivision would be completed and infrastructure would be
installed).
186 See, e.g., Austin L. Mitchell & Elizabeth A. Casman, Economic Incentives and Regulatory
Framework for Shale Gas Well Site Reclamation in Pennsylvania, 45 ENV’T SCI. & TECH. 9506,
9508 (2011) (describing Pennsylvania’s bonding requirement).
187 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 17, § 160.15 (2020) (“The owner of a wind energy facility
shall submit to the Corporation Commission evidence of financial security to cover the
anticipated costs of decommissioning the wind energy facility.”).
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address local externalities.  These subsections use the term “tax” loosely, for
simplicity, but the term as used here refers to all monetary tools just
described.
2. Property, Goods, and Services Taxed
Taxes levied at the state and local levels attach to a variety of goods and
services or associated impacts.  There are few pure Pigouvian taxes on local
harm-producing industries.  As introduced in subsection 1, the closest instru-
ments to Pigouvian taxes in this context might be bonds, which require
industrial operators to put money down—or otherwise indicate an ability to
pay—for potential damages they might cause.188  Colorado also distributes
parts of its oil and gas severance tax through “impact grants”—specifically
allocating funds to address the negative impacts of oil and gas
development.189
Other taxes are more tenuous in terms of addressing impacts.  In one
common form of oil and gas tax, states, and, in some cases, local govern-
ments, apply an ad valorem tax to energy development that taxes the value of
property that hosts industrial activity.  For example, Colorado taxes the prop-
erty on which oil and gas wells are located, although operators may use most
of the property value as a credit against other taxes imposed on the indus-
try.190  States also sometimes tax the value of the industrial equipment on the
property.  Colorado places an ad valorem tax on the “machinery, equipment,
and buildings” associated with oil and gas development, and this may not be
offset by severance tax payments.191
Other states similarly tax the property that hosts solar and wind energy-
generating facilities, and the facilities themselves, through an ad valorem tax.
California, Washington, and Oregon tax both the property (land) and infra-
structure of renewable energy installations, whereas Pennsylvania taxes the
property but not “nonrealty assets”—including the components of the wind
farm (towers and blades, for example) and transmission infrastructure.192
Additionally, the easement payments that property owners hosting renewable
energy farms receive are taxed as capital gains, with money flowing to the
188 See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-5-104(d)(v)(A), 30-5-404(b) (2020) (requiring at
least $5000 for the first 1000 acres of seismic testing).
189 HEADWATERS ECON., HOW COLORADO RETURNS “UNCONVENTIONAL” OIL REVENUE TO
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 4 (2014), [hereinafter HEADWATERS ECON., HOW COLORADO
RETURNS], https://headwaterseconomics.org/wp-content/uploads/state-energy-policies-
co.pdf.
190 Memorandum from Larson Silbaugh, Principal Economist, Colo. Legis. Council
Staff, on Effective Severance Tax Rates on Oil and Gas (Jan. 12, 2018) (available at https:/
/leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/interested_persons_memo_on_severance_taxes.pdf)
(noting that property tax expenses offset severance tax obligations).
191 COLO. OIL & GAS ASS’N, COLORADO OIL & GAS INDUSTRY TAX WHITEPAPER 2 (2011),
https://www.naro-us.org/Resources/Documents/COGA%20Whitepaper.pdf.
192 P. Barton DeLacy, Wind Farm Valuation Issues for Ad Valorem Taxation Purposes, WIL-
LAMETTE MGMT. ASSOCS. INSIGHTS, Summer 2014, at 85, 88.
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federal and potentially state governments.193  Easements for a “definite term
of years” are taxed as income.194  But some states also offer credits or exemp-
tions to reduce the burdens of the tax and to attract the industry to the state.
For example, under a constitutional amendment, Florida exempts the value
of wind and solar energy devices from the ad valorem tax on personal
property.195
Natural gas pipelines produce similar types of tax-based revenue.  Some
states, such as Virginia, allow local governments to tax the value of interstate
natural gas pipeline companies’ equipment based on a state determination
of the value, which includes, for example, operating improvements, machin-
ery and equipment, transmission mains and lines, and the land occupied by
the pipeline.196  Pipeline easements, as with renewable energy easements, are
taxed as capital gains.197
Beyond taxing the value of purchased and installed physical equipment,
severance taxes and similarly named instruments tax the product of indus-
trial activity, such as oil and gas or the electricity from wind energy.  Some
states tax wind energy production, with Wyoming charging one dollar per
megawatt-hour of wind energy produced.198  And in 2018, the National Con-
ference of State Legislatures indicated that thirty-four states taxed oil and gas
production.199  Pennsylvania’s tax, included in this count, is called a “fee”
but has all of the definitional characteristics of a tax as defined in subsection
II.C.1 of this Article.200  The tax is unlike most other oil and gas taxes, how-
ever, in that it is not levied based on the quantity of the resources produced.
Rather, the state allows local governments to levy the fee on all producers
who “spud” (drill) a hydraulically fractured gas well in the state, and the reve-
nues are distributed to address a variety of community impacts.201
Other taxes that apply to all industries or people in a state can also pro-
duce revenue when local harm-producing energy development booms within
the state.  For example, wind energy and oil and gas companies pay state
193 See CHALK ET AL., supra note 84.
194 See Roger A. McEowen, Selected Tax Issues for Rural Landowners Associated with Ease-
ment Payments, LAW PROFESSORS BLOG NETWORK: AGRIC. L. & TAX’N BLOG (Nov. 7, 2016),
https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2016/11/selected-tax-issues-for-rural-
landowners-associated-with-easement-payments.html.
195 FLA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 3(e)(2), 4(i)(1)–(2).
196 VA. DEP’T OF TAX’N, STATEMENT OF ASSESSED VALUES FOR LOCAL TAX PURPOSES FOR
RAILROADS AND INTERSTATE PIPELINE TRANSMISSION COMPANIES 20–29 (2019).
197 See McEowen, supra note 194.
198 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 39-22-104 (2020).
199 Anne Kolesnikoff & Cassarah Brown, State Oil and Gas Severance Taxes, NAT’L CONF.
OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 6, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/oil-and-gas-
severance-taxes.aspx.
200 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2302 (2020).
201 See id. (stipulating the annual fee schedule); id. § 2314(g) (enumerating thirteen
ends to which localities can devote funds raised through the Act 13 fee); Act 13 Fee Schedule,
PA. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N (2019), https://www.act13-reporting.puc.pa.gov/Modules/Dis-
bursements/FeeSchedule.aspx (calculating the fees for a given year).
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corporate income taxes that other industrial actors within the state similarly
pay.202  Additionally, when workers rush into towns along with a booming
industry, revenues from state and local tourism taxes on rental cars, hotels,
and similar expenses tend to increase.203
Many of these taxes and revenues do not go directly to impacts, and the
items and services taxed are often not adequately related to impacts.  For
example, taxing the energy production equipment itself, such as an oil and
gas well or a wind farm, or the energy produced from it, only indirectly
addresses impacts.  The more energy infrastructure and the more energy
produced, the more impacts there are likely to be.  But some energy equip-
ment may produce few to no damages depending on the company operating.
And one oil and gas well or wind turbine that produces unusually large quan-
tities of energy does not necessarily produce more impacts, although to the
extent that the equipment must be larger, or the well deeper and longer, to
produce more energy, more impacts could accrue.
3. Timing of Tax or Fee
Taxes or fees levied on local harm-producing activities vary in terms of
when they are imposed and when the revenues from the tax may be spent.
Some taxes are charged quarterly or annually.  And even when imposed
annually, some taxes do not reflect the increased value of the good taxed
until several years after that value changes and is newly assessed, as often
occurs with the ad valorem tax on property.204  Taxes with a lag between the
item or activity taxed and the revenue distribution can be problematic in that
they fail to address immediate impacts associated with energy develop-
ment.205  In contrast, production taxes are often levied monthly.206
The timing of revenue distribution also varies among different financial
tools.  For example, North Dakota voters elected to lock some revenues from
taxation of unconventional oil development in the state in a “legacy fund,” to
be spent at an as-yet-determined point in the future.207  This type of delayed
202 See COLO. OIL & GAS ASS’N, supra note 191, at 2 (noting corporate taxes paid by the
oil and gas industry).
203 See, e.g., REGIONTRACK, OKLAHOMA OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY TAXATION: COMPARATIVE
EFFECTIVE TAX RATES IN THE MAJOR PRODUCING STATES 17, 21 (2018) (noting that the oil
and gas industry pays these taxes in substantial amounts).
204 See HEADWATERS ECON., HOW STATES RETURN REVENUE TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
FROM UNCONVENTIONAL OIL EXTRACTION: WINDFALL OR MISSED OPPORTUNITY? 2 (2014)
[hereinafter HEADWATERS ECON., HOW STATES RETURN REVENUE TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS],
https://headwaterseconomics.org/wp-content/uploads/state-energy-policies-report.pdf
(noting one-to-three-year time lag in local property taxes).
205 See, e.g., HEADWATERS ECON., HOW COLORADO RETURNS, supra note 189, at 1 (noting
that in Colorado, property taxes on oil and gas produced within a local government’s
boundaries do not produce revenues until “two years after initial oil production begins”).
206 HEADWATERS ECON., HOW STATES RETURN REVENUE TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, supra
note 204, at 2.
207 See North Dakota Legacy Fund, N.D. OFF. OF STATE TREASURER, https://
www.treasurer.nd.gov/north-dakota-legacy-fund-0 (last visited Sept. 20, 2020) (describing
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revenue distribution could be problematic if immediate externalities needed
remedying, but it is also beneficial in terms of ensuring the availability of
funds to address both known and as-yet-unidentified risks.  One known
future cost in North Dakota will be the inevitable bust that follows an oil
boom when workers flee the state, leaving behind schools, housing, and
other infrastructure not yet at the end of their useful lives.208  And there
have already been examples of risks that were not initially identified but
proved to require millions of dollars of cleanup, such as leaking distribution
and oil lines in the state and low-level radioactive wastes from oil sites that
were improperly disposed of.209
In the case of wind energy development, locking up some revenues
could be similarly important, particularly for decommissioning old wind
farms.  If local governments or states do not require the posting of bond
money for decommissioning, a tax or fee with a delayed distribution time
could ensure the availability of money to clean up dangerous, abandoned
electrical infrastructure.
Bonds can involve even more of a time lag because a local government
does not use bond money until it confirms that the entity engaged in an
energy development activity did not perform its obligations, such as properly
decommissioning renewable energy infrastructure.  But this lag is not overly
problematic from the standpoint of externalities because the government has
the money available upon discovery of the externality and industry’s failure
to address it within the time limit provided.
4. Location of Tax and Distribution of Revenue
Many taxes and fees are raised, and sometimes distributed, based on the
location of the activity taxed.  For example, Pennsylvania’s unconventional
gas well fee, which local governments may elect to impose on each well that is
drilled and hydraulically fractured, is levied based on the location of drilling
and partially distributed back to communities in which drilling occurs.210
And in Colorado, in addition to a state severance tax, local governments tax
the oil produced within their jurisdiction.  These types of taxes and fees can
better address externalities because they raise money in the place where the
impacts fall and allow at least some of the money to go back to addressing
the Fund).  West Virginia has a similar fund, but no money goes to the fund when the
budget is not balanced. See Future Fund to Sit Empty, INTELLIGENCER (Wheeling) (Jan. 18,
2015), https://www.theintelligencer.net/news/top-headlines/2015/01/future-fund-to-sit-
empty/.
208 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
209 See, e.g., James MacPherson, 5 Years and $100M Later, Huge North Dakota Oil Spill
Finally Cleaned Up, INS. J. (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/mid-
west/2018/09/21/502039.htm; Nick Smith, Dumped Filter Socks Found in Williston, BISMARCK
TRIB. (Mar. 12, 2015), https://bismarcktribune.com/bakken/dumped-filter-socks-found-
in-williston/article_b83ee1ae-c0af-5b74-8a51-e5f395b946f2.html#:~:text=last (describing
illegal dumping of filters that absorb low-level radioactive wastes from oil wells).
210 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2314 (2020).
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these impacts.  If not designed properly, they do, however, leave out jurisdic-
tions near those with oil and gas production that experience impacts such as
traffic and housing overflow.211
Impact fees—typically applied to new land development involving hous-
ing subdivisions, but which also sometimes address industrial development—
are even more location-focused.  If the residents in a new subdivision will
create more traffic or strain existing potable water infrastructure, impact fees
charged of these residents go directly toward improving the affected roads or
water pipes.212  Similar fees placed on the energy industry could cover the
costs of the same things; oil and gas development often requires new water
and sewage connections and roads.213  Indeed, Santa Fe County, New Mex-
ico, requires oil and gas developers to assess and pay for the new infrastruc-
tural demands that they will create.214
In a somewhat rougher approach to matching revenues with the loca-
tion of impacts, many statewide severance and production taxes are distrib-
uted to the localities that experience production.  For example, sixty percent
of the revenues from Wyoming’s tax on wind energy production are distrib-
uted to counties with wind farms,215 and in Oklahoma, a portion of the sever-
ance tax goes to counties for highway funds, with more of the tax going to
counties with more oil production.216
5. Taxation Amounts
A final feature that varies substantially among tools for raising local reve-
nue is, of course, the amount of money collected.  An independent think
tank that has compared states’ taxes on hydraulically fractured natural gas
and oil wells concludes that the effective tax on these wells ranges from 3.3%
to 11.7% of the value of oil and gas.217  Bond amounts also vary substantially
and often fail to directly address the externalities of development because
they are often not tailored to specifically address risk.  Indeed, a recent study
of thirteen states’ bonding requirements for oil and gas wells concludes that
211 See, e.g., HEADWATERS ECON., HOW COLORADO RETURNS, supra note 189, at 4
(describing the problem of Colorado local governments’ taxes on oil only accruing to the
local governments, leaving out “adjacent communities experiencing impacts related to
population growth and industrial activity”).
212 See, e.g., J.K. Constr., Inc. v. W. Carolina Reg’l Sewer Auth., 519 S.E.2d 561, 563 (S.C.
1999) (describing an impact fee that each new customer connecting to a sewer line or
expanding an existing line had to pay, which funded the costs of the sewage system).
213 Cf. Rossi & Serkin, supra note 184, at 669 (proposing exactions for local electricity
infrastructure needed for new housing and commercial development).
214 SANTA FE CNTY., N.M., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. xv, § 150.02, Exhibit B, § 9.6.2.1
(2008).
215 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 39-22-111 (2020).
216 HEADWATERS ECON., UNCONVENTIONAL OIL AND NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION TAX
RATES: HOW DOES OKLAHOMA COMPARE TO PEERS? 21 (2013), https://headwater-
seconomics.org/wp-content/uploads/State_tax_comparison_study.pdf.
217 HEADWATERS ECON., HOW STATES RETURN REVENUE TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, supra
note 204, at 3.
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bond amounts in eleven of these states were unlikely to adequately cover
damages.218  The study also notes that bonds could be better designed to
directly address damages.  Bond amounts could vary based on different char-
acteristics of wells that made some riskier than others, such as the depth of
wells and their proximity to groundwater.219
A similar approach could be used for other energy infrastructure.  For
example, if local governments were allowed to impose bond requirements on
natural gas pipeline companies under a uniform, state-approved system, the
state government could specify different bond amounts that local govern-
ments could adopt based on characteristics such as population numbers and
their proximity to the pipeline, the number of steep slopes and thus poten-
tial soil erosion in the area disturbed by the pipeline, and other factors.
6. Limits on Local Taxation
Just as local governments are substantially constrained in their ability to
regulate certain industries with disproportionately large local impacts, local
governments’ taxation powers vary dramatically among states.  Only approxi-
mately twelve states provide local governments with home rule fiscal author-
ity, and five out of these twelve states grant very limited fiscal authority.220
States limit local governments in terms of the types of taxes they may levy, the
amount of taxes and revenues permitted and methods for appraising prop-
erty value, and the processes through which local governments may form new
taxes, such as the local voter approval required for the taxes.221
For the many local governments that lack the power to independently
levy adequate taxes and fees, in some cases they also receive too little revenue
from state taxes.  States with shale gas development redistribute fourteen to
fifty-five percent of total revenue back to local governments, showing the dra-
matic variation in approaches.222  Indeed, local governments in states such as
North Dakota, despite receiving some state tax revenue, experienced “net
negative fiscal effects” from development, as did some local governments in
Colorado and Wyoming “during heavy phases of development.”223
In summary, local governments have varied authority to directly tax the
externalities of energy production.  Few governments may impose direct
218 Jacqueline S. Ho, Jhih-Shyang Shih, Lucija A. Muehlenbachs, Clayton Munnings &
Alan J. Krupnick, Managing Environmental Liability: An Evaluation of Bonding Requirements for
Oil and Gas Wells in the United States, 52 ENV’T SCI. & TECH. 3908, 3913 (2018).
219 Id. at 3909–10.
220 DALE KRANE, PLATON N. RIGOS & MELVIN B. HILL JR., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A
FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 476–77 tbl. A1 (2001).
221 See, e.g., HEADWATERS ECON., HOW COLORADO RETURNS, supra note 189, at 4 (noting
caps on “local revenue growth”); Scharff, Powerful Cities?, supra note 20, at 306–12 (2016)
(describing different ways in which states limit municipal taxing and revenue
expenditures).
222 HEADWATERS ECON., HOW STATES RETURN REVENUE TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, supra
note 204, at 2.
223 Newell & Raimi, supra note 11, at 2.
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taxes or fees on externalities without express permission of the state govern-
ment.  But local governments likely could more broadly use exactions and
impact fees—which they regularly impose on housing developments—in the
energy context.224  To the extent that governments could impose these types
of fees, this would give them needed leverage in terms of enticing energy
developers to enter into more extensive negotiations with local governments.
D. Negotiation
In 1960, Ronald Coase explored an alternative to the Pigouvian frame-
work, which assumes that industry should be forced to internalize the costs of
its harms through governmental intervention.225  Coase argued that as long
as relying on a private pricing system is “without cost”—in other words, there
are zero transaction costs—the cost to neighbors of the harm-producing
activity should be weighed against the cost of shutting down the activity, and
one entity should pay the other’s damages.226  Negotiation between the two
sides would simply result in the instigator of the more highly valued activity
paying the other side for the costs experienced.227  For example, if shutting
down a polluting factory would be more costly than the costs of factory pollu-
tion to neighbors, the factory should continue operating, and the factory
operator should simply pay the neighbors for the damages inflicted.228
This Section explores both private and individual bargaining in the con-
text of activities with large localized externalities, arguing that this Coasean
option is also often quite limited.
1. Private Negotiation
Bargaining between individual landowners and developers of energy
projects could address many of the very localized effects of these projects,
particularly where the impacts are so local that they accrue solely on the
property where the project is located.229  But many effects, such as noise,
224 Cf. Rossi & Serkin, supra note 184, at 669, 686 (proposing exactions for the energy
infrastructure required for new development).
225 Coase, supra note 2, at 29.
226 Id. at 2.
227 Id. at 3 (showing that the harm causer will increase the harm-causing activity if the
value of the additional harm is greater than the cost of paying for it).
228 See id. at 2–6.
229 Community negotiation for benefits from energy developers has been more com-
mon internationally but is gaining traction in the United States. See OFF. OF MINORITY BUS.
& ECON. DEV., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, GUIDE TO ADVANCING OPPORTUNITIES FOR COMMUNITY
BENEFITS THROUGH ENERGY PROJECT DEVELOPMENT 9–10 (2017) (providing examples of
CBAs for a liquefied natural gas import terminal and an oil refinery modernization pro-
ject); Sandy Kerr, Kate Johnson & Stephanie Weir, Understanding Community Benefit Pay-
ments from Renewable Energy Development, 105 ENERGY POL’Y 202, 204, 205–08 (2017)
(documenting wind CBAs in the United Kingdom); Letter from Daniel Courtemanch,
State of Maine, Department of Environmental Protection, to Blue Sky West, LLC, at 39
(Sept. 2014), https://www.maine.gov/dep/land/sitelaw/selected-developments/bing-
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-2\NDL203.txt unknown Seq: 41  1-DEC-20 13:47
2020] taxing  local  energy  externalities 603
localized air pollution, and light pollution, can spill beyond property bound-
aries.  And bargaining between individual landowners and industry, particu-
larly in the oil and gas context, is limited.
In oil and gas, many estates are split—one individual owns the oil and
gas, another individual owns the surface.230  The oil and gas owner may use
the surface as is reasonably necessary to develop the minerals, without paying
any damages to the surface owner.231  Surface owners overlying separately
owned mineral estates are therefore largely powerless to bargain with indus-
try, absent government intervention.232  But some oil and gas companies do
bargain with landowners—even when they are not required to do so—in part
to avoid ongoing disputes over the reasonableness of their activities, or sim-
ply to foster good will.233
The states that have directly addressed the issue of split property in the
renewable energy context have tended to prohibit separate estates, with the
exception of leases under fifty years.234  Surface owners in these states may
not sever the air rights and solely lease the air rights to a wind or solar devel-
oper, thus giving the surface owner direct bargaining power.
2. Government Negotiation
As an alternative or supplement to regulation, governments, too, have
strong negotiating powers—if they have the option of wielding a regulatory-,
liability-, or taxation-based threat.  If local governments have extensive
authority, the threat of enforcement can be so heavy that the process really is
not negotiation at all.235
ham/bingham_wind_project_final_order.pdf (referencing community benefits agree-
ments  between several local governments in Maine and Blue Sky West, LLC); City Approves
Exclusive Community Benefits Agreement with Castle Wind to Pursue Mutual Benefits of Offshore
Wind Project, CASTLE WIND (Nov. 30, 2018), http://castlewind.com/city-approves-castle-
wind-offshore-project/.
230 See, e.g., Phillip Wm. Lear & Stephanie Barber-Renteria, Split Estates and Severed Min-
erals: Rights of Access and Surface Use After the Divorce (And Other Leasehold Access-Related
Problems), in 50 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 10-1, 10-4, 10-5 (2004) (noting 438 million acres
of split estate minerals managed by the Bureau of Land Management for federally owned
oil and gas).
231 See generally Bruce M. Kramer, The Legal Framework for Analyzing Multiple Surface Use
Issues, 44 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MIN. L. FOUND. J. 273 (2007) (describing this doctrine and the
difficulty of proving that use of the surface is unreasonable, although arguing that surface
owners have some recourse under some balancing applied by the courts).
232 Only approximately eleven states require negotiation with or compensation to sur-
face owners for damages. Id. at 334–35.
233 See, e.g., Dana & Wiseman, supra note 38, at 869 (describing memoranda of under-
standing between oil and gas communities and municipalities in Colorado).
234 See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-13-19 (2020).  Texas is the exception, with wind
developers tending to lease the wind estate separately, albeit without explicit statutory
approval. See Ernest E. Smith & Becky H. Diffen, Winds of Change: The Creation of Wind Law,
5 TEX. J. OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. 165, 176–77 (2009).
235 Threats can be so strong that they impede any meaningful negotiation, as explored
in the administrative law context. See, e.g., Tim Wu, Essay, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L.J.
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In the case of externalities that fall heavily at the local level, local govern-
ments often negotiate extensively—but only with limited types of industries.
The most common form of local government negotiation is in the residential
and commercial construction context.236  Governments regularly impose
impact fees on construction, requiring developers of large projects to pay for
the costs of new roads, sewage lines and connections, potable water, and simi-
lar infrastructure that the local government might have to provide.237
Some legal doctrines limit this bargaining authority or its results.  For
example, governments are prohibited from using “contract zoning,” in which
they tie the hands of future city councils or commissions.238  Under this doc-
trine, cities are not supposed to make quid pro quo arrangements, in which
they agree to approve a project only if the developer provides perks like
schools or parks.239  But this arrangement is often what occurs in reality, pro-
vided the city strikes the deal in a public hearing and obtains public benefits.
Some constitutional provisions also limit certain aspects of negotiation
and its results.  Negotiations can be an unconstitutional regulatory taking if
they require conditions on development that are not aimed at the harm cre-
ated and are disproportionate to the harm in terms of the amount of com-
pensation demanded.240  Further, even government-developer negotiations
1841, 1844 (2011) (describing agency threats involving “warning of agency action related
to either ongoing or planned behavior”).  But there has also been productive agency-indus-
try negotiation. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State,
45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 57–66 (1997) (describing Project XL, in which the EPA, empowered by
statute, negotiated permits with a citrus juice manufacturer and Intel); Shi-Ling Hsu, A
Game-Theoretic Approach to Regulatory Negotiation and a Framework for Empirical Analysis, 26
HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 33, 33–39 (2002) (describing Clinton-era “regulatory reinvention,” in
which Congress allowed “federal agencies to negotiate compromises with regulated
parties”).
236 See, e.g., Daniel P. Selmi, The Contract Transformation in Land Use Regulation, 63 STAN.
L. REV. 591, 593 (2011) (noting that “land use approvals are now increasingly the subject of
negotiations leading to binding contracts between local governments and development
interests”).
237 See, e.g., City of Olympia v. Drebick, 126 P.3d 802 (Wash. 2006) (describing a state
act that allows local governments to require impact fees paid by developers to fund fire
stations, schools, parks, and roads); St. Johns Cnty. v. Ne. Fla. Builders Ass’n, 583 So. 2d
635, 642 (Fla. 1991) (validating in part a county impact fee for school costs); Ronald H.
Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation: Paying for Growth with
Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177, 182 (2006) (noting that local governments’ use of impact
fees placed on residential and commercial development has “dramatically accelerated”).
238 See, e.g., Daniel A. Spitzer, Patricia E. Salkin & Michael Bookser, Host Community
Agreements for Wind Farm Development, 9 N.Y. ZONING L. & PRAC. REP., Mar.–Apr. 2009, at 1,
2–4 (discussing illegal contract zoning in the wind energy host-community agreement
(HCA) context but arguing that an HCA does not involve contract zoning).
239 Id. at 3–4.
240 See, e.g., David L. Callies & Julie A. Tappendorf, Unconstitutional Land Development
Conditions and the Development Agreement Solution: Bargaining for Public Facilities After Nollan
and Dolan, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 663, 666–69 (2001) (discussing Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard and their impacts on development
agreements).
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that result in the developer paying an impact fee, rather than mitigating
impacts or offsetting damages, can amount to takings.241
Aside from these doctrines, local negotiating power to address the dis-
tinct localized harms from industry is, in the absence of preemption, theoret-
ically strong.  There are different types of tools available in this context,
including community benefits agreements, in which developers provide
funds or actual infrastructure such as parks or schools, and good-neighbor
agreements, in which developers agree to reduce the environmental and
social impacts of oil and gas development.242  Indeed, some local govern-
ments have used negotiation to address the harms of fracking and wind
energy development.  Garfield County, Colorado, used a softer form of nego-
tiation than the quid-pro-quo-type agreement that occurs in the building con-
text.  A community organization convened public meetings in which
members of the community expressed concerns about the potential impacts
of fracking, and industry voluntarily agreed to follow “Best Management
Practices” to reduce harms and address these concerns.243  The agreement is
explicitly not legally binding but instead relies on an “ongoing exchange” of
information between industry and the community.244  Boulder County, Colo-
rado, takes a more direct and one-size-fits-all negotiation approach, promis-
ing expedited approval of wells if operators agree to conditions such as
stronger air- and water-quality protections.245  A number of other communi-
ties in Colorado have similarly entered into memoranda of understanding
with oil and gas operators, in which the operators commit to mitigate certain
impacts.246
These types of community-industry agreements appear to have been rel-
atively uncommon in the oil and gas context, however, outside of Colorado.
The more common form of negotiation in the fracking context is the road
use agreement, in which operators agree to pay for or repair any damage
caused to roads by heavy trucks.247  For example, in Ohio, companies that
241 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 602, 615–17 (2013).
242 Kristen van de Biezenbos, Contracted Fracking, 92 TUL. L. REV. 587, 614–19 (2018).
243 See GRAND VALLEY CITIZENS’ ALL., THE RIFLE, SILT, NEW CASTLE COMMUNITY DEVELOP-
MENT PLAN 8–9 (2006), http://www.oilandgasbmps.org/docs/CO68-RSNCCommunityDe
velopmentPlan.pdf.
244 Id. at 4.
245 CTR. FOR SCI. & DEMOCRACY & CONSENSUS BLDG. INST., MANAGING THE RISKS OF
UNCONVENTIONAL OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT: WHAT LOCAL COMMUNITIES CAN LEARN FROM
OTHERS’ EXPERIENCES 9 (2015), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/
07/ucs-managing-risks-unconventional-oil-gas-development-2015.pdf; see also George K.
Foster, Community Participation in Development, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 39, 83 (2018) (not-
ing that “at least thirty municipalities in Colorado have negotiated ‘operator agreements’
with” the oil and gas industry).
246 Dana & Wiseman, supra note 38, at 869.
247 See, e.g., Leah A. Dundon, Mark Abkowitz, Janey Camp & Craig Philip, Assessing
Impacts to Transportation Infrastructure from Oil and Gas Extraction in Rural Communities: A Case
Study in the Mississippi Tuscaloosa Marine Shale Oil Play, J. RURAL & CMTY. DEV., no. 2, 2018, at
16, 32 (noting the use of road use agreements).
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plan to drill a horizontal well must provide proof of a road use agreement
with the local government before receiving a state permit to drill.248
Community-industry negotiation has likely been most common for road-
related issues in the fracking context because many local governments retain
strong regulatory power over locally owned and managed roads.249  Due to
the backup threat of regulation in this context, these governments have the
power to bring industry to the table to negotiate.  The same is not true for
other externalities, such as local air pollution, chemical spills, and other
effects of fracking.250  Giving local governments more regulatory control—a
veto power over fracking, so to speak—would likely induce more efficient
Coasean bargaining to address externalities.251  But the trend has been in
the other direction, toward more preemption.
Negotiation in the form of host community agreements (HCAs) appears
to be somewhat more common in the renewable energy context252—perhaps
because there is not as much state preemption of local regulation of wind
energy.  As with oil and gas, these agreements focus largely on impacts to
roads.  But in a much more ambitious vein than many oil and gas negotia-
tions, most HCAs also include provisions for wind developers paying commu-
nities for the impacts of development.253
Communities also increasingly enter into community benefits agree-
ments (CBAs)—which are similar to HCAs—with renewable energy develop-
ers.  Maine strongly incentivizes this negotiation by providing that the state’s
Department of Environmental Protection may grant an expedited wind
energy permit to a developer if the developer will provide “tangible benefits”
to the community that will host the wind farm.254  A developer may provide
proof of tangible benefits under this state law by entering into a CBA with the
host community.255  Towns such as Bingham, Maine, have accordingly final-
ized CBAs with wind energy developers in which the developer agrees to
make an “annual contribution to the town.”  The town uses this contribution
for “property tax reductions, economic development projects, land and natu-
ral resource conservation, tourism promotion or reduction of energy
costs.”256
Further, communities have successfully negotiated for benefits from
industry in the LNG terminal context, where the federal government must
248 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.06(A)(11)(b) (West 2020).
249 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 137.1 (2020); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 81.0523(c)(1)
(West 2019).
250 Some industry actors negotiate despite the lack of a regulatory threat.  For example,
a strong company culture of maintaining a “social license to operate” might lead to volun-
tary negotiation.
251 Spence, supra note 4, at 393–94.
252 See, e.g., Spitzer et al., supra note 238, 2–3, 6 (describing agreements between local
governments and wind developers in New York).
253 Id. at 2.
254 ME. STAT. tit. 35-A, §§ 3451–3459 (2020).
255 Id. §§ 3451(10), 3454(2).
256 Id. § 3451.1-B.
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consult with states about state and local safety concerns.257  For example,
Robbinston, Maine, entered into a CBA with an LNG terminal developer that
established a County Economic Trust Fund, a goal that five percent of sup-
plies would come from “local, qualified contractors,” a goal that sixty percent
of the workforce would be recruited from the county, and requirements for
“[c]onstruction job training[,] [s]chool education support[,] and [r]oad
repair and transportation.”258
Where developers have adequate incentives to sit down at the table—
whether due to state or federal incentives to negotiate locally, a commitment
to a social license to operate, or a threat of a local regulatory or financial
stick—negotiations to address social and environmental externalities can be
quite effective.
III. DRIVERS OF THE REGULATORY VOID
State governments—and, in the case of natural gas pipelines and export
terminals, the federal government—substantially constrain local govern-
ments’ authority to address externalities, including for industries with harms
that fall disproportionately at the local level.  This would have little import if
states and the federal government adequately addressed these harms.  But
particularly when the majority of negative effects fall locally, with benefits
spread more broadly, higher-level governments have little incentive to act.
And even if these governments were motivated to act directly on behalf of
local governments, they might not be the best governments to do so.  Local
governments often need to address variable issues, with noise from wind tur-
bines or oil and gas drilling posing more of a problem in some neighbor-
hoods than others, and local land use law, as opposed to uniform statewide
ordinance, might best address the most variable effects.
This Part explores the reasons for the limitation on local governments’
powers to regulate, tax, impose liability on, or negotiate with many of the
energy industries that cause disproportionately large local effects.
A. Federalism
Traditional federalism accounts give at least two conflicting reasons for
blockading local governments from what would seem to be their natural reg-
ulatory turf—the project of addressing the externalities that accrue at the
local level.  The race-to-the-bottom theory suggests that despite large, local-
ized externalities, local governments might ignore these externalities if the
money from development proved adequately alluring.  These governments
might compete to attract industry through lax regulation, thus leading to
inadequately mitigated collective harms.259
257 15 U.S.C. § 717b-1(b) (2018).
258 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 229, at 9.
259 See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?  Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1212 (1977). But see Rich-
ard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale
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A competing federalism account, the “inefficient conflicting regula-
tions” story, worries that a patchwork of varied or overly restrictive local regu-
lations will unduly impede industrial development, leading to
problematically low levels of industrial development.260  In the states that
have allowed local control over industries with relatively large local externali-
ties, there is not uniform evidence that this will occur.  For example,
although Wabaunsee, Kansas, banned wind energy development—an action
affirmed by the state’s supreme court—other local governments welcomed it,
and Kansas is a leading wind energy state, with installed capacity nearly equal
to California’s.261  But in places like the Northeast, a nontrivial number of
communities have waged decades-long battles against wind farms.262  And in
the oil and gas context, before New York banned hydraulic fracturing that
uses large volumes of water (as most modern fracturing does), dozens of
local governments in the state had banned or placed moratoria on the prac-
tice, showing that a collection of numerous local restrictions can substantially
block growth.263
B. Government Resources, Competencies, and Ethics
Beyond federalism concerns regarding potentially conflicting regula-
tion, a long-simmering movement against local control, particularly in the
fiscal arena, worries about local competence and corruption.  The argument
is that local governments simply are not good at raising, or cannot be trusted
to raise, funds in a fiscally responsible and ethical manner.  This movement
arises out of a period of massive, rampant local government corruption,
which far exceeded by degree and scale the local corruption that still
endures today.264
Local governments have several potential advantages, however.  Particu-
larly important to localized externalities, they can attract skilled volunteers
who can help monitor and address the impacts of industry.  Through “bucket
brigades” and similar mechanisms, volunteers can measure local levels of pol-
lutants, regularly observe and record noise levels and aesthetic conditions at
industrial sites, and call potential problems to the attention of local regula-
for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1211–12 (1992) (arguing that
the race can be positive).
260 See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV.
4, 10, 72 (2010) (noting federalism arguments focused on the importance of uniformity).
261 See supra note 162 and accompanying text (describing the Kansas Supreme Court’s
affirmance of a local ban on commercial-scale wind energy); U.S. Installed and Potential
Wind Power Capacity and Generation, OFF. OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY,
https://windexchange.energy.gov/maps-data/321/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2020) (showing
robust wind capacity in Kansas).
262 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
263 See, e.g., Caroline Cecot, No Fracking Way: An Empirical Investigation of Local Shale
Development Bans in New York, 48 ENV’T L. 761, 763 (2018) (noting hundreds of communi-
ties with bans).
264 See supra note 18. But see SCHRAGGER, supra note 20, at 69–77 (blaming curbs on
local fiscal and other policy for some of local governments’ current challenges).
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tory officials.265  Additionally, volunteers can engage in ongoing negotiations
with industry over the acceptable level of externalities and potential remedies
for externalities, as they have done for oil and gas development in Garfield
County, Colorado.266
In the vein of corruption, it is not clear that local governments are in
fact more likely than state or federal officials to misspend funds, promulgate
inadequate regulations due to capture or bribery, or otherwise poorly govern
externalities.  A long literature has debated this point.267  On the one hand,
some scholars argue that capture and corruption are less likely to occur at
the local level, where citizens can more easily monitor and root out problem-
atic conduct by officials and call these officials to task through shaming and
other mechanisms.268  And it is more difficult for regulated actors to capture
hundreds of local governments than it is to capture more centralized state
and federal agencies.  But local officials’ physical closeness to regulated
actors makes it more likely that they will regularly rub shoulders, potentially
creating more opportunities for both formal and informal repeat interac-
tions that could sway local policy in favor of regulated actors to the detriment
of the public.
C. Transaction Costs
Another potentially legitimate reason for legislatures’ hesitance to per-
mit broad local governmental authority is that governmental regulation is
not only expensive in terms of increasing the costs of doing business.  Regula-
tion itself has transaction costs, just as negotiation does.  Indeed, govern-
ments must incur massive costs to identify externalities; determine how and
whether to address them through regulation, fiscal tools, or other
265 See, e.g., Gregg P. Macey et al., Air Concentrations of Volatile Compounds Near Oil and
Gas Production: A Community-Based Exploratory Study, 13 ENV’T HEALTH 1, 4–6, 15  (2014)
(describing effective citizen monitoring of air pollution near oil and gas well sites).
266 EAB Citizen Representatives, GARFIELD CNTY., COLO., OIL & GAS DIV., https://
www.garfield-county.com/oil-gas/eab-citizen-advisory-board/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2020).
267 See, e.g., CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION AND LOCAL DEMOCRACY: INTER-
EST GROUPS AND THE COURTS 15–30 (2011) (noting the distinct potential for local corrup-
tion); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, 10 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 45,
86–88 (1994) (noting the potential for capture and corruption at the local level, specifi-
cally, and providing examples, although defending the ability to prevent these problems);
Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitutionality in Land-
Use Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1, 38 (1992) (noting various pathways to the capture of local
governments).
268 David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U.
PA. L. REV. 487, 555–58 (1999) (agreeing with many of Judge Cooley’s arguments about
the prospects for local governments avoiding capture by private interests); Paul A. Diller,
Reorienting Home Rule: Part 2—Remedying the Urban Disadvantage Through Federalism and Local-
ism, 77 LA. L. REV. 1045, 1098 (2017) (noting that local governments are more accessible to
less well-funded interest groups).
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approaches; and implement and enforce the regime chosen.269  In the case
of taxation, setting a tax at the right level—an amount that adequately deters
harm-producing behavior and adequately compensates communities for the
harm but does not overly stymie beneficial development—is exceedingly dif-
ficult.  So, too, is directly regulating an activity at a level that prevents or
mitigates harm.  Although the transaction costs of individualized negotia-
tions between developers and hundreds of communities are themselves quite
high, a regulatory solution would not necessarily be cheaper from a transac-
tion-cost perspective, particularly where there are many, diverse externalities
that differ by location.
D. Responses
An approach to local externalities based on a combination of a uniform
financial tool designed at the state level and implemented locally, combined
with a mandate for some government-industry negotiation, addresses con-
cerns about federalism and local corruption, and it overcomes the political-
economic barriers noted above.  A tax is likely more politically feasible than
other policy tools from a political economy perspective.  “Tax” is a fraught
word for most politicians, but the political risk of this mechanism can be
slightly reduced simply by labeling it as a fee, as Pennsylvania did.270  And a
tax does not carry with it the often-negative features ascribed to command
and control regulation, which is viewed as inefficient and overly burdensome.
Rather, a tax—particularly one that directly taxes externalities—will simply
cause the operator to weigh the costs of externality control against the gov-
ernment-established price.  And regulation does not typically produce reve-
nues for the state government, aside from permit fees, which often only cover
the cost of administering the regulatory system.  In contrast, a state-designed,
local government-imposed tax, with some revenues designated for state pur-
poses, provides a tempting option for state legislatures looking to fill revenue
gaps.
The tax-negotiation approach is also likely politically superior to a
revised liability scheme, in which there would be a lower threshold for prov-
ing nuisance and other torts from energy activity.  In the current political
and fiscal climate of overworked judges operating in crowded courts,
expanding the possibility of tort litigation is not typically a legislative priority.
Additionally, requiring local officials or individual property owners to use
courts to curb excessive local externalities would have high transaction costs.
Uniform approaches such as tax—calibrated by some degree of case-by-case
negotiation—offer a middle ground in terms of the costs of reducing local
impacts.
269 See Demsetz, supra note 34, at 567 (noting “[s]tate-associated costs of errors, imple-
mentation, and improper motivation” that arise from governmental solutions to
externalities).
270 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2302 (2020).
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Finally, a tax-negotiation approach would likely have fewer governmental
transaction costs than several alternatives.  As compared to local or state reg-
ulation of industry, a tax would likely be far less costly to design and imple-
ment than multiple regulations addressing separate externalities.  Although
setting the tax at the proper level to address the externalities would be diffi-
cult, it would be simpler to administer—through annual collections, for
example—than a panoply of regulations to address separate externalities, all
of which would require staff inspections, issuances of notices of violation, and
hearings to address contested compliance cases.
Additionally, the existence of the tax, combined with state-level require-
ments for or incentives for local bargaining, would likely produce fewer
transaction costs for industry than the other tools explored here.  If local
governments had the authority to “veto” local energy development through
regulation, the detailed negotiations that industry might have to pursue for
each project could be quite time consuming, particularly given the many
stakeholders with competing concerns about energy development.  The
result could be a multiyear negotiation process with each individual govern-
ment that hosted proposed energy development, followed by litigation from
stakeholders who remained dissatisfied with the consensus.
IV. EMPOWERING REASONABLE LOCAL CONTROL
Despite some legitimate reasons for questioning strong local authority,
local governments need tools to address externalities, particularly for grow-
ing energy industries with disproportionately harmful local effects.  Through
careful design, these tools can address federalism, local competence, and
transaction-cost concerns, balance these concerns with the need for local
control, and allow energy development to proceed, even rapidly.
This Part proposes a combination of monetary tools and state-level man-
dates or incentives for negotiation as a solution.  The tax or fee should be
designed by a state-local commission, approved by the state legislature, levied
by local governments, collected by the state, and largely redistributed to local
governments, with certain limiting conditions for the local expenditure of
funds.  This would allow for a uniform policy—avoiding a patchwork of local
policies or a potential race to the bottom—and would be administered pri-
marily at the state level, thus also addressing concerns associated with local
government competency and ethics.  The design of the tax by a commission
that included state and local representatives, and which would make a recom-
mendation to be approved by a state legislature, would also avoid potentially
lopsided policy that overly favored state or local control, although the state
would still have the upper hand.
In addition to the fiscal solution, state governments should implement
approaches similar to Maine’s and Ohio’s—and the federal government’s
offshore wind and LNG terminal policy—that incentivize or require energy
developers to negotiate with local governments.  As introduced in Section
II.D, Maine grants expedited state permits to wind farms that enter into a
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community benefits agreements with local governments.271  Similarly, Ohio
requires that in order for a horizontal well operator to receive a permit to
drill, the operator must first enter into a road use agreement with the host
community.272  Additionally, when the federal government considers bids for
energy developers that want to lease offshore land for wind development, it
prioritizes bids that show an existing community benefits agreement between
the developer and the coastal community or communities most impacted by
development.273  Further, as described in Section I.C, Congress requires the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to consult with states about state and
local safety concerns associated with an LNG terminal and to specifically
address these concerns when it issues a permit for the terminal.274
A local government’s ability to tax the energy industry might incentivize
some bargaining, thus reducing the need for state mandates or additional
incentives for negotiation.  But because the tax proposed here—designed at
the state level, with extensive input from local governments—would be uni-
form among localities, energy developers might simply view the tax as a cost
of doing business, thus quickly paying the tax and moving on.  Additional
nudges might be required to spur developers to seriously negotiate with com-
munities over externalities.  And a state-designed tax will never be perfect;
given information and resource limitations, the tax will not exactly capture
all externalities or produce the proper amount of revenue needed to address
those remedies.  Negotiation will help to address these loose ends.  This Part
discusses one example of a taxation approach similar to the one proposed in
this Article, explores how the tax could be better designed, and argues for
why a tax-negotiation approach would be the best means of addressing the
localized externalities of energy development.
A. Lessons from Pennsylvania
In 2012, the Pennsylvania legislature instituted a tax that reflects many
of the attributes proposed in Part IV.275  Through an “unconventional gas
well fee” formed as part of a larger statute, the state allowed local govern-
ments to choose to impose a fee on each hydraulically fractured well “spud-
ded” (drilled) within their jurisdiction.  The fee, which is essentially a tax
under the definition in Part I of this Article, is a uniform amount per well
(which varies based on the price of natural gas, and declines over time),276
thus avoiding concerns about a conflicting patchwork of taxes that will be
unpredictable and overly deter development.  And although local govern-
271 See supra notes 254–80 and accompanying text.
272 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.06(A)(11)(b) (West 2020).
273 BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., RESPONSE TO COMMENTS AND EXPLANATION OF
CHANGES FROM THE MASSACHUSETTS PROPOSED SALE NOTICE TO THE FINAL SALE NOTICE 2–3
(2014).
274 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
275 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2302–18 (2020).
276 Id. § 2302(b).
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ments choose to impose the fee,277 the state initially collects all of the reve-
nue, keeps some for state purposes, and then redistributes some of the
revenue to local governments, specifying the purposes for which the reve-
nues may be spent.278  This addresses concerns about local governments’
competence in terms of raising revenue and applying it to the areas where
they are most needed.
The revenues from the tax are, for the most part, distributed directly to
address the externalities caused by the wells taxed.  Following distributions of
set amounts of money to causes such as conservation, improved fishing and
boating, and emergency response services, the state funnels sixty percent of
the revenues to counties and municipalities and allows the governments to
spend the funds for thirteen specific purposes, such as environmental conser-
vation, affordable housing (which can address housing shortages caused by
booming oil and gas production), and road and public infrastructure
repair.279  The remaining forty percent of the revenues flow to a state legacy
fund for environmental and highway and bridge improvement initiatives, but
fifteen percent of this forty percent goes to all counties in Pennsylvania,
including those that do not have gas well development.280  In 2018, the fee
generated more than $209 million in total revenue.281
To a large extent, Pennsylvania’s unconventional gas well fee appears to
achieve the Pigouvian purpose at the heart of this Article.  The distribution
of some revenues to all counties, even those without wells, might not initially
appear to address highly localized externalities.  But this approach could
cover impacts from development that also fall on counties without wells, such
as truck traffic through the county to a neighboring county with wells.  Addi-
tionally, the purposes for which municipalities and counties with wells may
use the revenues appear to generally align with the externalities experienced
by these counties, such as increasing demands on public services ranging
from emergency response to courts or displacement of affordable housing as
workers rush into town.
The amount of the tax seems well designed in that it is higher if natural
gas prices are higher.  When industry receives higher prices for natural gas,
this might spur more production—and associated externalities—and would
also mean that industry could likely afford to pay a larger tax amount.  The
tax is also tethered to the consumer price index, thus ensuring that the
amount paid does not fall behind the actual cost of damages.282  Further, the
277 Id. § 2302(a).
278 Id. §§ 2303(b), 2314.
279 Id. § 2314(c)–(g).
280 Impact Fee Distributions to State & Local Governments, PA. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, http://
www.puc.state.pa.us/filing_resources/issues_laws_regulations/impact_fee_collection/
impact_fee_distribution_state_local_gov.aspx (last visited Sept. 13, 2020).
281 Marie Cusick, Pennsylvania’s Gas Impact Fees Rise to $209 Million This Year,
STATEIMPACT PA. (June 21, 2018), https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2018/06/21/
pennsylvanias-gas-impact-fees-rise-to-209-million-this-year/.
282 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2314(c)(4) (2020).
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timing of tax distribution likely reasonably addresses externalities, in that
much of the money is distributed on an annual basis to communities and
some passes through a legacy fund to address longer-term, as-yet-unrealized
impacts.283  Finally, the tax allows some flexibility to address unanticipated
externalities.  For the fifteen percent of the legacy fund allocated to all coun-
ties for environmental initiatives, the legislature specifies the initiatives on
which the money must be spent but does not require counties to report their
expenditures to the state, thus essentially allowing counties to make their
own interpretations with respect to the acceptable uses of the fund.284
B. An Effective Local Tax-Negotiation Approach
Pennsylvania’s approach appears to be largely effective in terms of
directly addressing some of the localized externalities of development while
allowing a state-level priority—allowing and supporting natural gas develop-
ment—to proceed.  But several improvements could be made if this type of
scheme were to be applied more broadly.  First, a tax of a uniform amount—
albeit one that is adjusted based on the price of natural gas and the con-
sumer price index—will inevitably fail to address the true cost of certain
localized externalities, or might even overcompensate for some externalities.
And limits on the expenditure of revenues from the tax will miss certain types
of externalities.  A local tax designed at the state level should be accompa-
nied by requirements for periodic analysis of the actual localized costs and
benefits of development and a requirement for reconsideration of the taxa-
ble amount on the basis of this analysis.  This analysis should also examine
whether there are types of externalities that are not covered by the permitted
revenue distribution and should also make recommendations for modifying
distribution rules.
Beyond a provision for periodically modifying the tax, a state-designed
tax should also allocate some revenues to local governments with almost no
strings attached, thus allowing the local governments to decide which harms
most urgently need to be addressed.  State legislatures that are concerned
about local corruption and competence are likely to resist this type of provi-
sion, but the legislature could, at minimum, require local governments to
report on their use of this discretionary pot of funds and revise these discre-
tionary provisions if the legislature perceives abuse.
Additionally, with respect to the timing of distribution, a tax on energy
externalities should contain a provision through which local governments
could apply for emergency distributions that would be available between
annual revenue distributions.  In the event of a toxic or large-scale spill of
hydraulic fracturing chemicals, for example, a local government might need
funds urgently.
With respect to the type of activity taxed, a tax that is levied on a per-well
basis is more feasible to implement from an administrative perspective than
283 Id. §§ 2314(d), 2315.
284 Impact Fee Distributions to State & Local Governments, supra note 280.
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direct taxes on individual harms, such as spills or air pollution.  But it might
provide the wrong incentives to industry.  Taxes should ideally be designed
to deter externality-producing behavior; they should be set at a point at
which industry might reasonably choose to avoid creating the externality to
begin with, rather than causing harm and paying for it.  To preserve the effi-
ciency of a per-well tax but to better incentivize good behavior, the tax system
should allow for reduced tax amounts or waivers for companies that have
demonstrated a solid record free of environmental compliance problems.
This might even incentivize practices that go above and beyond the external-
ity reductions preferred by communities.
The issues relating to tailoring and reanalysis of the tax amount and
revenue distribution also demonstrate that a local tax—designed at the state
level in a uniform amount—will not be the best approach for all energy
projects.  Some projects, like LNG terminals, are larger, more centralized,
and less numerous than oil and gas wells.  For these projects, a fee or other
solutions—such as industry commitments to engage in best practices for
avoiding local harm—could be established on a case-by-case basis without
imposing unreasonable transaction costs.  This case-by-case approach would
better capture the actual externalities associated with each project.
The challenges of tailoring a uniform tax to localized externalities also
highlight the importance of combining a taxation scheme with a state man-
date or incentive for energy industry negotiation with local governments.
Negotiations could address impacts that local governments wished to pre-
vent, rather than receive compensation for—particularly irreversible or rela-
tively large impacts.  Negotiations could also allow the government to obtain
additional funds for externalities unaddressed by the revenue distribution of
the tax.  And they could cause the local government to forgo imposing the
tax altogether, and instead obtain compensation and commitments to miti-
gate harm through an agreement tailored more specifically to the commu-
nity’s circumstances.
Another important consideration is the question of whether the tax-
negotiation scheme would augment or replace existing schemes.  As
described in Part I, energy development is currently regulated by a
hodgepodge of approaches.  For oil and gas production, states increasingly
preempt local regulation—even local land use regulation—and regulate
some environmental effects at the state level.  For natural gas pipelines, the
federal government preempts most state and local control.  For LNG termi-
nals, states and local governments are also preempted, but the developer
must consult with them about safety impacts.  And local governments have a
great deal of regulatory control over solar and wind farms, although many
states have a state-centric siting process for these farms, which in some cases
can override local regulations that would impede development.285
The tax-negotiation scheme envisioned here would largely augment, not
replace, these existing approaches.  For oil and gas development, state-level
285 See supra Part II.
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regulation of environmental impacts remains important and likely alleviates
the need for a large tax because it already prevents many externalities.  And
many of the transaction costs of regulating—identifying the externalities and
how to best address them—have already been incurred, although inspections
and enforcement remain costly.  For pipelines and LNG terminals, a tax and
additional negotiation incentives would fill some of the important gaps left
by federal preemption of local control.  Keeping preemption in place would
enable efficient siting of projects that could otherwise be held up by individ-
ual landowners or local governments, but adding the tax and negotiation
incentives or requirements would ensure that local externalities currently
unaddressed by the preemption regime were recognized and compensated
for.  With respect to renewable energy development, the tax-negotiation
scheme might lessen some of the local opposition that currently emerges in
the form of local bans or challenges to the state-centric siting process.  But in
some cases, the tax-negotiation scheme might need to replace existing gov-
ernance approaches.  For example, if renewable energy development is so
urgent, from a climate policy perspective, that delays from local opposition
are deemed to be unacceptable, governments may need to limit procedures
for challenging state siting decisions and preempt some local regulatory con-
trol in addition to implementing the tax-negotiation approach.
Traditional regulatory authority should remain firmly in place in some
contexts—particularly for harms of development that are irreversible and
must be prevented, such as rare yet deadly gas-pipeline explosions.286  But in
cases in which harms are problematic yet not massive, regulations are rela-
tively sticky and difficult to adapt, and regulations that are overly stringent
(due to incorrect predictions of risk) or that inadequately address externali-
ties can take years to change—if they change at all.287  Further, when indus-
try is more knowledgeable about risks than regulators are—as is often the
case in the highly technical areas of energy development—regulations might
not accurately capture the largest risks, absent structured industry involve-
ment in the regulatory process.  Industry, facing a uniform tax and knowing
the risk of harm from its processes, could measure the value of creating the
harm and paying, or preventing it to begin with.
Existing tort solutions, like regulation, should also likely remain in place,
with augmentation.  Taxes are not tailored to address individualized dam-
ages; nor are negotiations between the local government and the developer.
Although these negotiations often result in payments that benefit the com-
munity and specific members within it, they are not designed to assess and
compensate for specific damages.  But just as regulations are not a foolproof
remedy to local externalities, a Pigouvian liability approach involving revised
286 See, e.g., Carol M. Parker, Note, The Pipeline Industry Meets Grief Unimaginable: Congress
Reacts with the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, 44 NAT. RES. J. 243, 247–48 (2004)
(noting a gas pipeline explosion in New Mexico that killed twelve campers).
287 See, e.g., Jim Rossi & Hannah J. Wiseman, Constrained Regulatory Exit in Energy Law, 67
DUKE L.J. 1687, 1688 (2018) (noting the stickiness of regulation and the regulatory adapta-
tion literature that suggests remedies to this, and providing cites).
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tort remedies would also not be ideal, particularly standing alone.288  While
modified tort policy might have across-the-board effects of reducing indus-
trial activity or its damages, relying upon case-by-case, ex post solutions in this
context might allow for serious local harms in the meantime, as shown by
rare yet problematic cases of drinking-water pollution from oil and gas activ-
ity.289  Tort liability only deters industry behavior if, like a tax, it is calibrated
at a proper level, and this calibration is quite hard to do.
Tort law, like regulation, is an important backstop to a tax-negotiation
regime in energy—not a replacement for it.  With the ability to charge the
energy industry for the localized externalities it produces and negotiate
around the edges, communities will have meaningful control over the
impacts that they experience, yet not so much control that they deter eco-
nomically and, in some cases, environmentally important development.
CONCLUSION
The energy sector in the United States—and globally—is at a critical
crossroads.  Climate change threats are no longer just threats.  California is
burning, intense storms pound the coasts, and seas are rising, engulfing parts
of cities.290  Rapid renewable energy development is essential, and, during
the transition to renewables and battery storage, natural gas will be necessary
to back up renewable resources.291  More wells and pipelines are therefore
an unavoidable part of the picture, at least in the short term.  But railroading
climate-friendly energy projects through a state and federal regulatory fast-
track is likely to encounter substantial local opposition.  Even preempted
local governments have found ways to raise enough alarm, whether through
scaremongering or creative legal arguments, to substantially delay or block
energy development.292  A middle ground is essential, in which energy devel-
288 But see Merrill & Schizer, supra note 10, at 228–50 (arguing for a tort-based solution
to fracking with regulatorily defined liability).
289 See, e.g., U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING FOR OIL AND GAS: IMPACTS
FROM THE HYDRAULIC FRACTURING WATER CYCLE ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES IN THE
UNITED STATES 33 (2016) (describing rare incidents of underground water contamination
from hydraulically fractured wells).
290 Thomas Knutson et al., Tropical Cyclones and Climate Change Assessment: Part 1: Detec-
tion and Attribution, 100 AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 1987, 2000–01 (2019) (describing
likely anthropogenic contributions to the intensity of certain recent hurricanes); 2020 Inci-
dent Archive, CAL FIRE, https://www.fire.ca.gov/incidents/2020/ (last visited Sept. 13,
2020) (“The length of fire season is estimated to have increased by 75 days across the
Sierras and seems to correspond with an increase in the extent of forest fires across the
state.”).
291 MASS. INST. TECH. ENERGY INITIATIVE, THE FUTURE OF NATURAL GAS: AN INTERDISCI-
PLINARY MIT STUDY 89 (2011).
292 See, e.g., Abby Kessler, State Court OKs Antrim Wind Project, Opponents Continue to Push
Back, MONADNOCK LEDGER-TRANSCRIPT (May 14, 2018), https://www.ledgertranscript.com/
Appeal-against-Antrim-Wind-project-struck-down-17499941 (in a state-centric siting process
for a wind farm, showing town residents’ legal challenges to the siting process, which
caused substantial delays for the modest ten-turbine project); Jimmy Vielkind, Developing
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opment may proceed, but local governments play more of a role than the
helpless defendant attempting to beat back an unpopular project.
The scholarly and judicial worlds tend to view the Not in My Back Yard
and Not on Planet Earth movements as efforts to be weakened or blocked so
that efficient development can move forward.293  But individuals and local
governments that oppose energy projects often do so for good reasons: they
experience the brunt of the negative impacts, but not the benefits.  These
communities will predictably resist development altogether if they cannot
adequately address its harms.  Indeed, the “homevoter hypothesis” in eco-
nomics posits that citizens will most forcefully lobby local governments for
policies that will preserve home value—the largest investment that many citi-
zens make.294  If a nearby wind turbine or gas rig threatens this value, a
homeowner will rationally resist this development.
Further, moderate local opposition to energy projects can generate pro-
ductive changes, even in areas where rapid development is needed, such as
renewable energy.  If excessive opposition to projects is constrained, local
governments that are empowered to tax developers and negotiate with them
can hammer out solutions that have fewer impacts on local landscapes and
resources.  And when communities have reasonable tools to address external-
ities, they may be less likely to take the extreme position of banning energy
development.  Indeed, to the extent that states or the federal government
view energy development as critical, they might be justified in preempting
local bans and moratoria provided they have offered adequate alternative
routes for local governments to address externalities.
The tax-and-negotiate approach is not a one-size-fits-all solution.  A uni-
form tax designed at the state level and implemented by local governments is
most feasible for projects that tend to be numerous and widely distributed,
such as oil and gas wells, renewable energy farms, and segments of an inter-
state pipeline that cross through hundreds of local government territories.
For centralized, less numerous projects such as liquefied natural gas termi-
nals, for which industry can reasonably engage in more lengthy conversations
with the community, negotiation alone might be adequate—provided the
local government has enough leverage to negotiate.
Ultimately, whatever the tools chosen, communities need the authority
to meaningfully address the externalities of development, and they currently
lack this authority in some contexts.  Oil and gas production and natural gas
pipelines pose the most problematic scenarios: local governments are largely
preempted from regulating or using other tools to address externalities, and
state and federal regulation inadequately addresses some local externalities.
This regulatory void can and should be filled.  State legislatures and the fed-
Wind Farm in New York Is No Breeze, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 3, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/developing-wind-farm-in-new-york-is-no-breeze-11572789601 (also showing substantial
delay in a state siting process for a New York wind farm due to landowner challenges).
293 See supra note 40.
294 WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 1 (2001).
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eral government can address federalism concerns of conflicting local regula-
tions by providing for a uniform tax that local governments may choose to
implement.  And they can address potential local corruption or incompe-
tence by specifying the externalities to be addressed, such as the causes to
which tax revenue must flow.
As they stand, the state and federal governments, which experience
many of the benefits of development but not the concentrated local costs, are
partially blind to this need.  No wonder, then, that disgruntled local govern-
ments impose moratoria and bans on energy projects.  A new path forward
will ensure that necessary energy development continues apace while balanc-
ing federal, state, and local priorities in the energy area.
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